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INTRODUCTION
The advent of

the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia

and Rwanda (ICTR) raised for the

time the topical question of the appropriate

first

and international

relationship or concurrent jurisdictional regime between national courts

tribunals.^

While

the Statutes of the

with national courts, they

conflict

by bestowing the

The Rome
(hereinafter

on the ICC

The most

general and

lies in its relationship to national courts

Rome

Statute,^

means

and

this

that a state with jurisdictional

right to institute proceedings before

national courts.

its

Bartram S.Brown, Primacy Or Complementarity: Reconciling The Jurisdiction Of National courts And

International Criminal Tribunals,23 Yale

'

imprimatur for an International Criminal Court

based on the principle known as "complementarity.'Tersely, complementarity as

competence has the foremost

^

its

the jurisdictional

primacy or priority jurisdiction.

totally different jurisdictional regime.

encapsulated in Article 17 of the

'

for concurrent jurisdiction

same time unequivocally resolve

the

which gave

effective jurisdictional limit

is

ICTY^ and ICTR^ provide

international tribunals with

Statute,'*

ICC) has a

at

(ICTR)

ICTY
ICTR

Art.9 (1) of the
Art.8 (1) of the

Rome

J. Int'l

L. 383,385(1998).

Statute
Statute

Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of

on

Plenipotentiaries

the Establishment of

an International Criminal Court, July 17,Annex

II,

U.N. Doc.

A/CONF. 183/9(1998)
^

See specifically Article 17 (l)(a) which provides

that... the

Court shall determine that a case

is

inadmissible where:
(a)

The case
State

(b)

is

is

being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over

it,

unless the

unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;

The case has been

investigated

by

a State

which has jurisdiction over

it

and the

state has

decided

not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or
inability
(c)

of the state genuinely to prosecute;

The person concerned has already been

tried for

by the Court is not permitted under
double jeopardy rule)
a

(d)

trial

The case

is

conduct which

is

the subject of the complaint, and

article 20,para.3(Art.20(3)talks

not of sufficient gravity to justify further action

by

the Court

of the ne bis

in

idem or

Such a competent

state

decides that the State

Although

it is

is

would not devolve

jurisdiction to the

ICC, unless the ICC

itself

"unwilling" or "unable" to genuinely investigate or prosecute.^

the catch phrase in the

Rome

Statute, the

term "complementarity" does not

appear in the Statute.Neologists, coined the term from the word "complementary", which

is

used in the preamble,^ and Article
In a nutshell,

1

of the Statute.

primacy represents the precedence of international courts over

national courts. In this case, the national judicial systems devolve their sovereign criminal

jurisdiction to the ad

hoc tribunals created by the Security Council acting under

its

Charter conferred powers. Complementarity on the other hand presents the opposite
scenario. Here, the

court

is

ICC

defers to national courts, unless

it

determines that the national

genuinely incompetent to investigate and prosecute a particular case.

The law of nations recognizes
criminal jurisdiction by a state.

five

They include

principles,

which permit the exercise of

territorial jurisdiction

based on the location

where the alleged crime was committed; nationality jurisdiction based on the nationality
of the offender; 'objective'

committed outside

territorial jurisdiction,

territorial limits

based on the protection of the interests

integrity of the nation; passive personality jurisdiction based

the victim; and universality jurisdiction for certain crimes

is sufficient.

states to reach acts

but intended to produce, and producing, detrimental

effects within the nation; protective jurisdiction

and the

which allows

on the

nationality of

where custody of the offender

Nationality and territoriality are the most widely recognized principles of

Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy L.H. McCormack, Complementarity as a Catalyst for Comprehensive
Domestic Penal Legislation,5 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 147,152(1999)
Preamble of Rome Statute, para. 10 emphasizes, "that the International Criminal Court established under
the Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."
* Harvard Research
in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime,29 Am. J. Int'l L. 437(Supp.
1935); The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States(1986) $. 402
*

jurisdiction.

Indeed, sovereignty over territory and authority over nationals are the

hallmarks of statehood.^Intemational law provides no definite priority over the various
principles of jurisdiction and this leads to conflict between states as a result of the fact

that

more than one

state

could have an interest in exercising jurisdiction over a particular

offender or defendant.

Concurrent criminal jurisdiction depicts a scenario where two or more judicial

systems have the legal capacity

same criminal

for the

to investigate, prosecute

and punish an accused person

acts under their respective, separate jurisdiction. 'Vhis usually

occurs between sovereign states." In the realm of crimes under international law, the
distinguishing characteristic

is

the universal jurisdiction that

is

conferred on

all

States to

prosecute and punish the perpetrators of such crimes.'^ The "cumulative effect of these
different principles of jurisdiction

sometimes

jurisdiction to prosecute a given crime.

is to

vest multiple states with concurrent

"'^

This paper would attempt to analyze the concept of primacy that governs the
concurrent jurisdiction model between the two ad hoc

ICTY and ICTR on

the

one hand,

and national judicial systems; and the concept of complementarity, which governs
concurrent jurisdiction between the

be made

to the

ICC and

national courts. In both cases, reference shall

concept of state sovereignty and the leverage

it still

law, albeit the transition to globalization and supranationalism.

'

Brown, supra note

'"

1

,at

has in international

Most of

the case studies

393

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International

Law,3 17-3 18(4* ed.,1990)(discussing concurrent

jurisdiction of the flag state and the territorial state over vessels in ports or territorial waters of the latter).

See Frederik Harhof, Justice In Cataclysm Criminal Trials In The Wake Of mass Violence: Consonance Or
To Prosecute War Crimes In National And International Tribunals,? Duke
J. Comp. & Int'l L.57 1,572(1997)
" See The Case of The Lotus (France v. Turkey),P.C.I.J.Ser. A,No. 10 (1927)
'^
See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, atl21 (vol.1, 1994)
'^
Brown, supra note I, at 392
Rivalry? Calibrating The Efforts

will refer to the ad hoc

come

ICTY and ICTR

into existence, thus

its

because they are functional. The

analysis shall be based on hypothesis.

ICC

is still to

CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

A-

The

creation of ad hoc international criminal Tribunals brought to the limelight the

debate about the appropriate relationship between national courts and international
''*

criminal Tribunals.

As

a result of the fact that justice

was imposed by

the victorious Allies over the

vanquished Germans, the issue of concurrent jurisdiction was remotely raised after World

War

I

and

memory

at

Nuremberg. However,

this writer thinks

it

is

important to take a ride

down

lane to the Treaty of Versailles in order to discern the trend and tortuous path

taken by international law until the

Rome

Statute creating an International Criminal

Court.

1-

The Treaty of Versailles'^

In a paper presented before the Grotius Society in

One

(hereinafter

civilized

WWI), Hugh

world will not

1

,at

in the heat of

World War

H.L.Bellot articulated that "the public opinion of the

rest satisfied unless,

upon the termination of the

the instigators but also the actual perpetrators of the

Brown, supra note

London

conflict, not

more heinous offences

only

against the

385

" Treaty of Peace Between The
Th

Allied

And

Associated Powers and Germany, concluded

28,1919,2 Bevans 43(hereinafter Treaty of Versailles)

at

Versailles,June

usages of war are brought to

and

after

trial

much compromise,

before

some

impartial tribunal."'^

the representatives of the Allied

At

the

end of the War

Powers and Germany

signed the Treaty of Versailles. Article 227 of the Treaty provided for an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal to prosecute Kaiser

Wilhelm

n

of Hohenzollem "for a

supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
the Allies

seemed unprepared

new

international crime.

and

its

failure to

Government
Netherlands
request

to create the precedent of prosecuting a

The Treaty's

make

treaties."

Head of

However,
State for a

characterization of aggression as a 'political' crime

reference to a specific international crime gave the Dutch

a legal basis to reject an Allied request for extradition of the Kaiser

if

such a request was ever presented.

was never made and
Articles

prosecution of

the Kaiser

was never

Due

from the

to the lack of political will, such a

tried.'^

228 and 229 of the Versailles Treaty, which provided for the

Germans before Allied

Military Tribunals for violating the laws and

customs of war was never implemented for the same reason. Instead of establishing an
Allied Tribunal, the Allies asked

German war
Trials).

Germany

Germany, which before had passed a national

'*

Leipzig.

Hugh

The Leipzig

it

to

Lippman,id

^'Id.

alleged

implementing Articles

assume jurisdiction under

its

national laws

Only twelve German

military

Their Prevention And Punishment,2 Transactions Of The Grotius Society
Mathew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later,7 Conn.J.Int'l L.l,4(1991)

"Art.227, 2 Bevans 43,136.
See Lippman, supra note 16,at 8-9

The Reichgericht
^Id.

legislation

Trials turned out to be a sham.

War Crimes:

H.L.Bellot,

31,37-38(1917). See

'*

number of

criminals before the Reichgericht,'^ in Leipzig (hereinafter the Leipzig

228 and 229, passed a new law allowing
at

to prosecute a limited

is

the

Supreme Court of Germany

895 prepared by the 1919 Commission were prosecuted.^^his lends

officers out of the

credence to the premise that states are always reticent to prosecute their

The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 between
Turkey's surrender of

its

the laws of humanity,'

the Allies and Turkey,

nationals in order to stand

was never

ratified.

trial

own

which

crimes.

provided for

presumably for 'crimes against

The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923

the Treaty of Sevres instead granted amnesty to Turkish officials.

The

that replaced

search for an

independent, fair and effective permanent system of international criminal justice started

on a wrong footing due

2-

to the lack of political will.

Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals

The

Tokyo

International Military Tribunals for

were

Tribunal)

8,1 945. ^"^he

established

Agreement was signed by

Nuremberg and

through

the

for the Far East (hereinafter

London

Agreement

of

August

The Soviet Union, France and

the United States,

Great Britain, and was adhered to by the other Allied countries. The Nuremberg Tribunal

determined that

its

jurisdiction

The making of

the Charter

the countries to

undoubted

was based upon the premise

was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by
which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the

right of these countries to legislate for the

recognized by the civilized world. The Charter

power on

that:

is

occupied

territories

has been

not an arbitrary exercise of

the part of the victorious nations, but in the

view of the Tribunal... it is
its creation; and to that

the expression of international law existing at the time of

extent

^^

Id. at

is itself

a contribution to international law.^^

War and on Enforcement of
convened the 1919 Preliminary Peace Conference in

14 (The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of

Penalties

was established when

the victorious Allies

Paris)
Id. See Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come For An International Criminal Court, 1 Ind.Int'l &
Comp.L.Rev. 1,2-4(1 991)
Agreement for the prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and
Charter of the International Mihtary Tribunal annexed thereto, August 8,1945,82 U.N.T.S. 279
Nuremberg Judgement, at 48. See 22 Trial Of The Major War Criminals Before The International
Military Tribunal, 412-413 (S.Paul A.Joosten ed., 1948). See Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf.An
^'

the

This gives credence to the concept that Nuremberg "constitutes a precedent for the
collective delegation through a treaty of a

mix of

territorial

and universal jurisdiction

to

an international criminal court. "^^The Tribunal thus affirmed the primacy of international

law over national law by holding

that the "very essence of the

Charter

is that

individuals

have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed

by the individual

State. "^^The

Nuremberg jurisprudence thus seemed

to lay to rest as a

practical matter, the theory that the constitution of an international criminal tribunal

contravenes the sovereignty of states per
basis of jurisdiction

se.

With regard

to territoriality principle as

by the Nuremberg Tribunal, Hans Kelsen

articulates the concept as

follows:

The unconditional surrender signed on June 5,1945,by the representatives of the
last legitimate Government of Germany may be interpreted as a transfer of
Germany's sovereignty

to

the victorious

powers who are signatories

to

the

surrender treaty.

German

been placed under
the sovereignty of the occupant states, the whole legislative and executive power
formally exercised by the German government has been taken over without any
restriction by the governments of the occupying states.
...Since the

Subsequent
sovereignty over

to

territory together with its population has

the

London Agreement and by

Germany following

enacted Allied Control Council

virtue

of their exercise of

the latter' s unconditional

surrender, the Allies

Law No. 10

(hereinafter

CCL

No. 10),which gave them

Insider's Guide To the International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia,37-38.5ee
Lippman,supra note 4, at 28.
^ Michael
P. Scharf, ICC Jurisdiction over Nationals, in The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 222(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000)
"Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Submitted by
the Secretary General," U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.l, U.N.Sales No.l949.V.8 (1949),16. See 22 Trial of the
Major War criminals before the International Criminal Tribnal, 461,466(Lake Success, N.Y. United

Nations, 1949). See Sewall

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26,at 34

Egon Schwelb "Crimes Against Humanity," British Yearbook of International Law (1946), 178
Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin,93 American Journal
of International

Law 518,524(1945)

A

carte blanche to prosecute

legal predicate elicited

government

in

German

nationals in their respective zones of occupation. ^'^e

by the Allies was

that they

were carrying out the functions of

Germany. This Allied conception meant

that the

CCL No.

10 proceedings

were part of the domestic law of Germany. The coexistence between the Nuremberg
(international jurisdiction)

Allies

came

CCL

10 (national jurisdiction) Trials

to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.

proceedings was inverted

its

and

when each of the

zone of occupation, with

all

is

However, the

four Allies set out

its

the nearest that the

fiction of national

own system

of justice in

but the United States implementing law of a military

nature.^'

Contrary to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the legal foundation of the Tokyo Tribunal

was established with
after the war.

the acquiescence of the Japanese

Government

that continued to exist

John Pritchard, the foremost expert on the Tokyo Tribunal

articulates this

view:

The legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal, unlike its Nuremberg counterpart depended not
only upon the number and variety of states that took part in the Trial but more crucially
upon the express consent of the Japanese

state to

court, relinquishing or at least sharing a degree or

However,
for a

number of

little

probative value

is

submit

itself to the jurisdiction

two of sovereignty

of such a

in the process.

^^

accorded to the decisions of the Tokyo Tribunal

reasons, amongst which

is

the perception that

its

proceedings were

Allied Control Council Law No.lO,Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes ,Crimes against Peace
and against Humanity,20 December 1945 .Official Gazette of the Control Council of

Germany ,No.3,Berlin,January 31,1946,reprinted in Benjamin B.Ferencz,An International Criminal Court:
Step Toward World Peace,488(1980)(hereinafter CCL 10)
^'
Cherif Bassiouni,Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 200(1992).5ee
B assiouni, 5«pra note 2,37-38
Sewall & Kaysen eds; supra note 26,at 224
R.John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and
in the Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial,xxxi,(R.John Pritchard,ed.,1998)
^^

Its

Contemporary Resonances,

10

substantially unfair to

this

when he

Commander

many

of the defendants.'^'* Professor Cherif Bassiouni corroborates

says that General Douglas

Mac

Arthur in his capacity as Supreme

of the Allied Powers had a heavy hand in the proceedings of the

Tribunal. ^^In the words of one critic, the

Tokyo example

Tokyo

primarily relevant in

"is

considering what a credible international criminal justice system ought not to look

like."^^

The

issue of concurrent jurisdiction

Nuremberg and Tokyo
punish Nazi

Germany

Trials.

for

It is

clear that the intention of the Allied

waging war and

witnessed by humanity. Thus, granting

committed by
favored the

nationals

its

was not an

summary execution

was vaguely or remotely raised

for

judicial process. "^^This justifies

defeated. Thus, the

Germany

issue for the Allied Powers. Britain initially

was so black"

why Nuremberg

that

it

"was beyond the scope of any

has been criticized for

Roman law maxim quod licet jovi non

^*

Leila

Kaysen

for crimes

Nadya

Sadat,

that

Sewall

were responsible,

Many

From

Versailles to

and another

is

to the

when they prosecuted

like

the

Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
Hum. Rts. J. 11,31-37 (1997)

disappearance of

to Establish

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26,at 34

" Telford Taylor, The Anatomy
The maxim means "what

felt after

bovi was not respected.

the Tribunal to rewrite history

Soviets

ex post facto

in

Sewall

&

34

International Criminal Court,10 Harv.
^^

licet

its

The Evolution Of the ICC: From The Hague To Rome and Back Again,

eds., supra note 26,at

^^Cherif Bassiouni,

the

to

concurrent jurisdiction over crimes

the Allies were applying one law to themselves

The Soviet Union used
Germans

Powers was

committing the most egregious crimes ever

applications of laws and for being justice of victors over the vanquished.

11 that

the

of the major Nazi war criminals like Hitler and Himler on

the premise that their "their guilt

World War

at

of the Nuremberg Trials, 17(1992).

lawful for victors

is

not unlawful for the vanquished."

A Permanent

11

approximately 15,000 Polish prisoners and 8300 Polish officers in Katyn Forest. ^^

A

defining example of this trend was the imposition of individual criminal liability on the

Nazis.

The

justification

by United

States Justice Robert H.Jackson for this

under international law.'^^To emphasize the

declare the principles as

view

that

we

see

them

were acting from a

fact that the Allies

position of authority, Jackson reminded the conferees that "there

now.""*' Professor

is

was tenuous

greater liberty in us to

Andre Gros of France

even though German aggression was an international crime,

it

elicited the

did not justify

individual criminal liability on the Germans. In his view, the imposition of such liability

would be "morally and

Even
compelling.

if

politically desirable but.

Nuremberg bequeathed

the Charter of the

the

law as expressed

in

its

moral value

is

Assembly on

become

Judgment of the

Tribunal,""^^ thereby

to prosecute the offenses addressed

IMT (Nuremberg Tribunal)," namely war crimes,

international

legacy,

the "principles of international law recognized

all states

the crime of aggression.'^hese have

not international law.""^^

United Nations General

Nuremberg Tribunal and

"codifying the jurisdictional right of

.it is

cloudy legal

This was confirmed when the

December 11,1946, unanimously affirmed
by

a

.

part

by the

crimes against humanity, genocide and

and parcel of the corpus of customary

the practice of States

and requisite opinio

juris.

^^

J.K Zawodny, Death In The Forest: The Story Of The Katyn Forest Massacre, at 5(1962), See Bassiouni,
supra note 35, at 24
Report of Robert H.Jackson, US Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials,at
295,297His notes provide the only contemporaneous record of the proceedings (hereinafter the Jackson
Report). See Bassiouni,5Mpra note 35,at 22 (excerpts of the Jackson Report)

Lippman, supra note 16,22
Id. at 23-24
"^G.A.Res.gS, U.N. Doc. Ay64/Add.l,at 188 (1946). See Sewall & Kaysen cds.„supra note 26,at 219
'*"
Kenneth C.Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,66 Tex. L. Review 785,786(1988)
"^

1

CHAPTER 2

AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND PRIMACY
A - CREATION OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS
1

- Legal bases for the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals
In a precedent setting venture, the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter

UNSC)

acting under

justice,

created

ad

hoc

(hereinafter ICTY)"^^ and

that within the period

There were

Charter conferred Chapter VII powers and with a vision for

its

Rwanda

from 1919

five ad

Criminal

International

(hereinafter

Tribunals

for

former

Yugoslavia

ICTR)/^ Professor Cherif Bassiouni holds

to 1994:

hoc international investigation commissions, four ad hoc

mandated or authorized
and World War II.These

international criminal tribunals, and three internationally

national prosecutions arising out of

World War

I

processes were established by different legal means with varying mandates, many
of them producing results contrary to those originally contemplated.'*^
After determining that the atrocities unraveling in the former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda

constituted a threat to international peace and security, pursuant to Article 39 of

the United Nations Charter, the

*^

The

clearly expressed the

The

that the establishment

Law

in the Territory

of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, was created on

ICTY

Statute)

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of

Humanitarian law committed

of Rwanda
created on November 8,1994,by
SCOR,49* Sess.,3453"*

in the Territory

Council Resolution 955.S.C.Res.955,U.N.

Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955(1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994)(hereinafter the
*''

May 25,1993,by

Resolution 827. S.C.Res. 827,U.N.SCOR, 48th Session, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827(1993),

reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993)(hereinafter the
**

view

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of

Humanitarian

UNSC

UNSC

Bassiouni, supra note 35,1

12

ICTR

Security

Statute)

13

of ad hoc tribunals would lead to the prosecution of those responsible for egregious
crimes and also contribute to the restoration of international peace and

security.'*

Since the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction can be achieved

only with the benediction of states that are expected to relinquish part of their
sovereignty, the question arose as to whether these ad hoc Tribunals and their Statutes

should be established by a multilateral treaty or via a U.N. Security Council
case of the former Yugoslavia the argument was

The

treaty approach

made

had several disadvantages

in

fiat."*^

In the

that:

terms of the time required for

the elaboration, negotiation and conclusion of a treaty in a multilateral forum, the
additional time required to attain the necessary ratifications for

its

entry into force

whose
Tribunal would

and, in particular, the absence of any guarantee that the States concerned
participation

become

The

would be

other alternative

Vn of the

essential

to

the

effectiveness of the

parties to the treaty.^^

Charter.

was

Two

establishing the tribunals via the

obligations for

The

tribunal... would

all

"it

for establishing the tribunal because the Security

Council would act relatively quickly" and also
the

acting under Chapter

advantages enunciated by proponents of this option were that

would provide an expeditious method

establish

UNSC

that, the

"Security Council's decision to

be effective immediately and would create binding

States."^'

legal bases for the creation of the

Nations Charter. The

UNSC can create

Charter, pursuant to Chapter

"*

U.N. Charter, Art. 39

'*'

Morris

& Scharf, supra note

12,at

"id.. See U.N.Charter, Arts.2 (6)

VH

40

& 25

ad hoc tribunals can be traced

in the

United

subsidiary organs as provided in Article 29 of the

edicts dealing with the

maintenance of international

14

peace and security.^^ Article 41 of the Charter
authority to create the tribunals

is

derived and

it

the

is

wade mecum on which

the legal

provides that the "Security Council

may

decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give

effect to

its

decisions."

It

goes forth to give a non-exhaustive

amongst which the creation of an international tribunal
neither

excluded.^^ Supporters of the

is it

UNSC

list

not expressly mentioned, but

is

find solace in the argument that the

foundations of the tribunals are not different from that of a treaty.

ICTY and ICTR were

established pursuant to

constitutive treaty.^'^Coupled to this

U.N. members are parties

ICTR

is

UNSC
was

Council's action

underlying authority for the

it

Chapter

the

the fact that almost

U.N. Charter, "thus

to the

of such measures

To them,

Vn

while the

resolutions, the

U.N. Charter, which
all

countries on earth, and

could be argued that the

As can be expected

U.N. Members.
in

all

ICTY and

exercise jurisdiction over nationals of countries with their implied consent

virtue of their obligations as

a

is

by

"^^

such situations that impinge on the sovereign rights of

states in international law, there

were challenges

to the legal bases for the establishment

of the ad hoc tribunals. These challenges are pertinent because they hinge on the

momentous

issues of primacy, states' compliance with the orders of the tribunals and the

effectiveness

of concurrent jurisdiction between the ad hoc tribunals and national

jurisdictions, as shall

be seen in the next chapter. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(Serbia

and Montenegro) promptly challenged the Security Council's authority

" Id., See

U.N.Charter, Art.29

Id.,

See U.N.Charter, Art 41 provides

that:

The Security Council may decide what measures not
its decisions,and it may call upon

involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to

Members of the United Nations

to apply

such measures.These

may

"Id.

the

include (emphasis added) complete or

of economic relations and of rail,sea,air,postal,telegraphic,radio,and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
^*
Sewall & Kaysen eds.„ supra note 26,at 225
partial interruption

to
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establish the ICTY.^^

She

particularly questioned

tribunal, particularly an international tribunal,

of any body, including the Security Council."

The

ICTY by

ICTY was

can be a subsidiary organ

again challenged in a pre-trial

the defense counsel for

with the argument of the Prosecutor that the

that

^'

legality of the establishment of the

motion brought before the

could establish the

29 of the Charter, expressing the view

tribunal as a subsidiary organ under Article

"no independent

UNSC

whether the

ICTY

Dusko Tadic.^^Concurring

not a constitutional court set up to

"is

scrutinize the actions of organs of the United Nations," but "a criminal tribunal with

clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific

Trial

Chamber held

Council and for

it

for the Security

alone and no judicial body."^^

in

an interlocutory appeal brought by the defense, took

Chamber's decision.

to determine the validity of

the establishment of the

by

was "pre-eminently a matter

that the question

The Appeals Chamber
issue with Trial

and limited criminal jurisdiction," the

its

own

ICTY by

It

found instead

that its inherent 'incidental'

jurisdiction gives

the

UNSC.^^ This

it

judicial fabric of a court

and does not need

to

leeway to review the legality of

inherent jurisdiction

the phrase la competence de la competence. ^^This

power

is

is

better

known

an important component of the

be expressly provided for in the Statutes

and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The decision of the Appeals Chamber to confirm
the legality of

its

establishment had some practical results.

from raising the matter again during

his trial

It

precluded Tadic's attorneys

and pre-empted further challenges

to the

Letter dated 19 may 1993 from the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General.U.N.Doc. A/48/170-S/25801
57
58

Id., at 3. See

Prosecutor

Morris

& Scharf.supra note

12,at

47

v.

Tadic, Case IT-94-I-T, (Aug., 1995). See Michael P.Scharf,Balkan Justice.at 103-104

v.

Tadic, Case IT-94-I-T, Decision on Jurisdiction, at

(1997)
^'

Prosecutor

^ Prosecutor v.

1 1

(Aug 10, 1995)

Tadic, Case IT-94-I-T-AR72,8-10(Oct.2, 1995). See Scharf,

French phrase relating

to a court's "jurisdiction to

determine

its

id. at

104

own jurisdiction."
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who

Tribunal's legitimacy by other defendants and national authorities

such challenges

in

domestic courts, in order to

resist

could bring up

compliance with the Tribunal's

orders to surrender and defer an accused person.

2 - Concurrent jurisdiction of the ad hoc international tribunals and national

The Primacy of the

courts:

international tribunals

Three general principles govern the relationship between the ad hoc international
tribunals

and national

authorities.

over national courts; non-bis
judicial assistance

between

in

They include

idem or the double jeopardy

states

primacy of the Tribunals

the following:

and the tribunals.^^The

rule;

last

and cooperation and

two

principles shall be

discussed later on in this paper.

While the Statutes of the
with national courts, they

conflict

by bestowing the

at

ICTY^

the

same time unequivocally resolve

international tribunals with

The provisions on primacy

may

competence of the International Tribunal
of procedure

sweep and they provide

have primacy over national courts. At any stage of

the procedure, the International Tribunal

Rules

the jurisdictional

primacy or priority jurisdiction.

in the Statutes are majestic in their

that the "International Tribunal shall

the

and ICTR^^ provide for concurrent jurisdiction

and Evidence. "^^

In

formally request national courts to defer to

in

the

accordance with the ...Statute and the

words of Bartram

S.

Brown,

this

" Scharf, supra
^^

"

note 58,at 104-105
See Frederik Harhof, supra note 10,

at

574

ICTY Statute
^^
Art.8 (1) of the ICTR Statute
^*
Arts.9 (2) of the ICTY and 8(2) of the ICTR Statutes (Their provisions are similar but with slight
variation. The ICTR grants "primacy over national courts," while that of the ICTY grants "primacy over
Art.9 (1) of the

national courts of

all

states" respectively)
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"arrangement represents the high water mark for the priority of international criminal
tribunals over national courts."^^

Primacy gives the international tribunals the authority

empt

a national court in a given case,

indeed impinges on

by requiring them

states'

to trump, supersede or pre-

where both can equally exercise

to

It

sovereign prerogatives to exercise their criminal jurisdiction

to defer to an international criminal court.

However, primacy does

not preclude states or national courts from exercising jurisdiction.

encouraged

jurisdiction.

A State shall indeed be

proceed with the investigation and prosecution of a case when there

is

no

reason to doubt that the investigation by the national authorities will be thorough, prompt

and impartial and the
tribunal established

It

is

trial will

be conducted by a competent, independent, and impartial

by law.

worth noting

that

primacy was established by the Security Council

response to specific threats to international peace and security, thus

it is

binding on

in

all

U.N. members. Former Prosecutor for the ad hoc international Tribunals, Justice Louise
Arbour, lends credence to the above by saying that the "four international criminal
tribunals

established this century

jurisdiction of national courts

were each granted primacy over the concurrent

and established by mandatory force"

Concordant with Articles 9 para.2 of the

ICTY and

^^

8 para.2 of the

ICTR

Statutes,

the assertion or invocation of primacy has to be in accordance with the Statutes and the

Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter RPE).^" In view of the unprecedented

^^

BTOwn,supra note l,at 385
Id.,at 386. See Morris & Scharf, supra note 12,at 126-127
Justice Louise Arbour ,The Need for an Independent and Effective prosecutor in the Permanent
International Criminal Court,17 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 207,214
™ ICTY RPE, U.N Doc IT/323/Rev.lO (1996), ICTR, RPE,U.N. Doc. IT/3/Rev.9 (1996)(revised)
^*
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character of primacy, the estabhshment of a uniform criterion and the procedures to be

followed for the assertion of primacy was of primary importance.

3 - Primacy and deferrals under

RPE:

Conflict with non-bis in idem principle

The Rules of Procedure and Evidence

are critical to the very survival of the

Tribunals because their Statutes do not provide ample information on the investigation,

trial

and appeals processes.^' Article 15 of the

task of adopting the

RPE7^ The

Statutes

ICTY

do not

application of primacy, but leaves this for the

endows

the Judges with the

mechanism

for the operation or

Statute

set forth a

RPE. Rules

8 through 13 enunciate the

primacy of the Tribunals over national jurisdictions and also provide the process by

which the Tribunals may
Michael Scharf hold

assert primacy. ^^

With regard

to this, Virginia

Morris and

that:

In terms of the relevant criteria, the International Tribunal

may

consider asserting

primacy over those cases that would facilitate or ensure its effective
functioning and the fulfillment of its mandate. The International Tribunal would
have a legitimate interest in asserting its primacy, rather than having the case
its

decided by a national court,
legal issues that

may have

if

the alleged criminal conduct involved factual or

significant implications in terms of investigation,

prosecution or adjudication of other cases as

Rule 9 of the
the Trial

Chamber

RPE

well.^"*

articulates the three bases for the Prosecutor to

to issue a formal request for deferral of a case

originally seized of the matter.^^

^'

Scharf, supra note 58,at 62- 63

^^

The RPE

A

deferral

are reproduced in Virginia Morris

invoke and ask

from the national court

expands the concept of primacy and

if

such a

& Michael P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International

Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 39-87, (vol.2 1995),)
Brown, supra note 1 ,at 396

See Morris
^^

Rule

9:

Where

& Scharf,supra note

12,129

Request for Deferral
it

appears to the Prosecutor that in any such investigations or criminal proceedings instituted in

the national courts of any State:
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request

is

granted, the Office of the Prosecutor incorporates the investigations from the

national authorities into

its

investigation,

and the persons under investigation become

subject to prosecution solely before the international Tribunal

Rule 9

(iii) is

While Rule 9

courts.

a defining

(i)

and

(ii)

7^

example of the primacy of the Tribunals over national

justify deferral

on the basis

that the national proceedings

are deficient. Rule 9

(iii)

empowers

because the national

trial

overlaps with an investigation or prosecution by the Tribunals.

In the

words of one

not merely

when

it

the Tribunals' Prosecutor to ask for a deferral solely

writer, "the Tribunal can assert its

will

remedy

specific

primacy

in virtually

any

situation,

problems with an ongoing national proceeding.

This distinguishes the primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals from the lesser complementarity
jurisdiction" for a permanent ICC.^^

However, the application of primacy

seems

via a deferral

to conflict with the

sacrosanct principle of non-bis-in-idem rule as provided in Articles 10 para.l and 9 para.l

of the

ICTY and ICTR

no one can be
bis in idem,

(i)

tried twice for the

which

para.2 of the

Statutes respectively.^^The non-bis in

ICTR

is

the

same

same crime.
rule).

(Art. 20 (2)

which

is

Rome

However, Articles 10

recognize that non-bis-in-idem

the act being investigated or

of

may

idem codifies the rule

that

Statute provides for ne

para. 2 of the

ICTY and

9

not apply in cases where the

the subject of those proceedings

is

characterized as an

ordinary crime;
(ii)

there

is

a lack of impartiality or indepndence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to

from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently prosecuted ;or
what is in issue is closely related to ,or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions
which may have implications for the investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal,
the Prosecutor may propose to the Trial Chamber designated by the President that a formal
request be made that the national court defer to the competence of the Tribunal.
See Brown, supra note 1,396. See Morris & Scharf, supra note 12,130
'•*
Brown, id. at 436 n.52 (1998)
" Id. at 396
^*
Arts. 10 (I) and 9(1) of ICTY & ICTR Statutes provide that:
No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of international
humanitarian law under the present Statute for which he or she has already been tried by the International
shield the accused
(iii)

Tribunal
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proceedings before a national court are "characterized as an ordinary crime," and
the national

trial

responsibility."

was

a

sham "designed

to shield the

when

accused from international criminal

These two grounds are also incorporated into the Tribunal's Rule 9 as

grounds for requesting deferrals from national courts to the International Tribunals.
Article 25 of the

ICTY

may

This indeed

Tribunal to appeal an acquittal.

idem and the accused's

permits the Prosecutor of the International

Statute,

interest in finality,

which underlies the American double jeopardy

Defense attorneys have indeed used the doctrine of double jeopardy

rule.^'

the jurisdiction of the

ICTY. Such was

the issue in the Tadic Case, ^^

submitted a pre-trial motion asserting that the
the principle of double jeopardy.

Germany had reached

in

acknowledged
the

German

that the

See Rule

their "final

phase."

German proceedings had passed

to challenge

where the defense

ICTY

will violate

the contention that at the

the proceedings against

Even though the

court issued an indictment against Tadic on

9(i)

Art. 25 of

of Tadic before the

ICTY from Germany,

to conclude that the rule of double jeopardy

^'

trial

The defense predicated on

time of Tadic's deferral or transfer to the

him

infringe the very fabric of non-bis-in-

Trial

their investigative

November

3,1994,

Chamber

phase when

it

went forth

had not been disturbed because the defendant

& (ii),supra note 62

ICTY

Statute^5e^ Scharf, supra note 58,72. See Brown, supra note 1,396

The U.S.Constitution's Fifth Amendment proscription against placing a person "twice in jeopardy" for
"the same offence" may come into play at an earlier phase in the criminal proceeding. Jeopardy applies in
"empanelled and sworn." See Crist v. Bretz,437 U.S. 28,98(1978); in Morris &
Scharf,supra note 13,at 133. Double jeopardy prohibits prosecution appeals of acquittals. The rationale for

jury

trial

the rule

once the jury

is

two

is

fold: (i) that the trial itself is a great ordeal,

ordeal must end. See United States

erroneous conviction that

v. Ball,

may occur

and once the defendant has been acquitted, the

163 U.S. 662,669(1896)

in the state,

with

its

(ii)

that the increased risk

of an

superior resources, were allowed to retry an

individual until it finally obtained a conviction. See United States v. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. 1 17,130(180);
See Scharf, id. at 72
Decision on the defense Motion on the Principle of Non-bis-in-idem, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,IT94-l-T(Nov.l4,1995)

a
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"had not been

German

B1

-

Is

tried in the full sense, that is,

he was neither convicted nor acquitted by the

court."^^

PRIMACY IN PRACTICE
primacy a theoretical or practical concept?
That primacy as provided

prerogative to exercise

its

in

the

and

Statutes

criminal jurisdiction within

Indeed, primacy pierces the veil of state sovereignty
jurisdiction of an international judicial institution

its

RPE

is

state's

territory is not in contention.

by requiring

even though the

to claim or exercise jurisdiction. This raises the question

theoretical or practical concept. This question

impinges on a

states to defer to the

state

has potent bases

whether primacy

is

just a

pertinent because states are very jealous

of their sovereignty and are reticent to relinquish this power.

That

said, the jurisdiction

of the ad hoc Tribunals trump those of national courts

despite the fact that the latter has both custody of a person accused of delicti jus gentium,

and concurrent jurisdiction
the Prosecutor

made an

to prosecute

and

punish.^"*

application for deferral of

This was a matter for concern when

Dusko Tadic

where the accused was being held. The Judges of the

to the

ICTY were concerned

Tribunal exercising primacy over a low profile defendant like Tadic,

Government could prosecute

ICTY by Germany

the case effectively, fairly

when

about the

the

German

and vigorously.^^The erstwhile

Prosecutor for the ad hoc Tribunals, Judge Richard Goldstone, responded to the Judges'

concern claiming,

*^

Id. at 4-5.

"in principle,

we have

encouraged, and

we do

encourage, national

See Scharf, supra note 58,at 107

Brown, supra note

1

,395

See Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for
Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Matter
of Dusko TadicCase No.IT-94-l-Dnov.8,1994. See also Scharf, supra note 58,100
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courts both within the

added

the Prosecutor

Former Yugoslavia and elsewhere

that the

to

conduct

However,

trials."

"Tadic case relates to an important investigation which was

"^^ This is a reflection of the rationale
in the Prosecutor's office.

in

any event under way

in

Rule 9 of the RPE, which

is to

the effect that the Prosecutor of the Tribunal could ask

for deferral if the issue before the national court

or legal questions which

may have

is

closely related to "significant factual

implications for investigations or prosecutions before

the Tribunal."^*

Since the Tribunals were created by
requests for deferrals to the Tribunals.

usually

transplant

international

UNSC fiat,

However,

obligations

to

States are obliged to

this is easier said

their

internal

comply with

than done. States

laws

by

implementing legislations passed by their respective Parliaments. Several

virtue

states

of

have

enacted local legislation permitting them to transfer indictees found on their territory to
the Tribunals.

However, the request

need not go through
before the ICTY,

that she

was not

for deferrals as provided in the Statutes

this tortuous legislative paths.

Germany accepted

the

in a position to surrender

^^

See supra note 63,Rule

^^

Amicus

^ Scharf,supra
Id.,

See also

amicus curiae^^

Dusko Tadic because

the necessary legislation

ICTY judges who reminded

the

German

the long established principle in international law that "a State cannot

avoid compliance with

curiae

as

RPE

primacy of the Tribunal, but also acknowledged

had not been passed.^^ This excuse incensed the

Government of

While appearing

and

means

its

international obligations

by invoking

9(iii)

friend of the court.

note 58,99
Art. 27 of

Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties

its

munincipal law."^'
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This shows

how

difficult

it is

to

implement primacy than

it

catches the eye

when one

reads the sweeping primacy provisions in the Statutes.

Thus, the Tribunals have been compelled to justify their assertion of primacy

on a

jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of the Statutes. In its rendition

motion on jurisdiction brought by the defendant Dusko Tadic, the

ICTY

pre-trial

held that

allowing concurrent jurisdiction without granting primacy to the Tribunal would, in

permit the accused "to select the forum of his choice, contrary to the principles

effect,

relating to coercive criminal jurisdiction."^^ This

the accused to chose and pick a sympathetic court,

biased

"forum shopping" would indeed allow

which could

result in a

sham, bogus or

^^
trial.

Other justifications for the sweeping primacy of the international Tribunals were
enunciated in a high profile case before the ICTY.^'* In the Prosecutor's request for the

Radovan Karadzic

deferral of

national courts

was

that

it

to the

ICTY,

the first reason given for

would prevent multiple courts from simultaneously exercising

jurisdiction over an accused. If these national courts

this

were allowed to prosecute the case,

could cause evidentiary problems resulting from different investigative procedures

employed

in

each of their judicial systems.^^ The second justification for primacy was the

danger of evidence being destroyed or damaged
trial. ^^

The

third reason elicited

Muslims was so intense

'^

Prosecutor

^^

Prosecutor

was

that the

that if a court

if it

were produced

in

more

Id. at

28

that

one

antagonism among the Croats, Serbs, and

dominated by one of the these groups were

v. Tadic, Case IT-94-I-T,41(Aug.lO, 1995).See also Bartram,supra note 49,398
Brown, supra note 1,398

Id. at 24.
^^

primacy over

v. Karadzic,Case IT-95-5-D (ICTY May,15,1995)(Request for deferral)
See BTOwn,supra note 1,396

to
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prosecute an accused of a different ethnic extraction, the national proceedings would not

appear to be independent and

Even though

fair.^^

the ad hoc Tribunals have primacy over states, their jurisdiction

is

concurrent, not exclusive.^^ In relative anonymity. States have been exercising

still

concurrent jurisdiction vis a vis the

This was the case

much

publicized

trials at

when Germany prosecuted Novislav

the international Tribunals.

Djajic and Nikola Jorgic for

war

crimes committed in the Balkans.^^ While explaining her role in the arrest of the
defendants, the

ICTY Prosecutor held

that:

The... cases were initiated and investigated by the

German

who

authorities,

consulted with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. The

Prosecutor assessed that

it

was not appropriate

to seek a deferral of these cases,

and the decision was made that they continue to be prosecuted by the German
authorities. There is on-going cooperation between the Prosecutor and the
r\n
German authorities on these and other cases.
1

Other European nations have

tried alleged

Yugoslav war criminals

in exercise of their

concurrent jurisdiction with the international Tribunals. Such was the case of
Cvjetkovic,a Bosnian Serb

civilians at Kucice.'^'

inflicted abuses

^

on

who was

Denmark

prosecuted and acquitted by Austria of the murder of

also prosecuted Refic Saric, a

his fellow prisoners

See Proposal for an International

Dusko

War Crimes

Muslim who

allegedly

and was acquitted on the basis of insanity.

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,U.N.SCOR,48*

Sess.,U.N. Doc. 5/25307(1993). See also Bartram,supra note 49,398

no

Sean D. Murphy,Developments

In International Criminal Law:Progress

and Jurisprudence of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, at 65,93 A.J.I.L. 57(1999)
''

The Prosecutor

v.

Djajic (Sup. Ct. Bavaria,3d Strafsenat,

May

23,1997) See Sean Murphy,5^Mpra note

98,65
Justice Louise Arbour's Statements Regarding War Crimes Related Trials Currently Underway
Germany, ICTY Doc. CC/PIO/17I-E (Mar.l9, 1997)
'"'
Iain Guest.On TriahThe United Nations, War Crimes,and the Former Yugoslavia, 178(1 995)
'°^

Id.,

See Sc\\did,supra note 58,101

in

1
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Rwanda

who was

has also prosecuted Froduald Karamira

sentenced to death, even though the

ICTR had

ICTY

from Ethiopia and

an interest in prosecuting the defendant.

In another pre-trial motion contesting the

lawyers raised the argument that the

extradited

^'^^

primacy of the Tribunal, Dusko Tadic's

could not lawfully order

Germany

to defer the

prosecution of the defendant to the Tribunal because this impinged on the sovereign right

and power wielded by U.N. members to prosecute and adjudicate

'^he

courts.

Chamber held

Trial

that

Germany and not Tadic had

raise the issue of violation of state sovereignty. '^^Relying

amongst which
Trial

Chamber

is

the

one established by the

rejected

the

defendant's

in

their national

the locus standi to

on a number of precedents,

Court in the Eichmann Trial/^ the

Israeli

sovereignty

plea.

The Appeals Chamber

concluded otherwise and considered the merits of Tadic's contention. '^^However, the
appellate

Chamber

ruled that borders "should not be considered as a shield against the

reach of the law and as a protection for those

who

trample the most elementary rights of

humanity."'^^It went forth to hold that the argument of state sovereignty

would not pass

muster where the nature of the alleged crimes shocked the conscience of humanity as a
whole.
erosion

The advent of
of the

sovereignty

is

the

human

rights revolution has led to the

once unassailable concept of sovereignty.

sacrosanct in the U.N. Charter and

is

The

slow but steady

principle

of State

encapsulated in Article 2 paragraph

Madeline Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,? Duke J. Comp.
"Death Sentence in Genocide," N.Y. Times, at 6(Feb. 15,1997)
Scharf, supra note 58,106. See also Brown, supra note 1,404
Scharf, id. at 106

& Int'l

L. 349,363(1997). See also
"'^

'"^

The Attorney-General v. Adolf Eichmann,Decision No. 336/61, May 21,1962, in Peter Papadatos,The
Eichmann Trial (1978); The District Court of Jerusalem held that 'The right to plead violation of the
sovereignty of a State is the exclusive right of that State. Only a sovereign State may raise the plea or waive
:

it,and the

accused has no right to take over the rights of that State."

'"^

Prosecutor

v.

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72 (Oct.2,1995)

'"*

Prosecutor

v.

Tadic, Case IT-94-I-AR72,31-32 (Oct.2,1995)

^^ Prosecutor

v.

Tadic, Case IT-94-I-AR 72,31-32 (Oct.2, 1995)
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7.^^^

However, the second part of

this provision restricts

"this principle shall not prejudice the application of

Vn." This

attests to the fact that the

judgment

its

criminal tribunal.^

that

enforcement measures under Chapter

argument of sovereignty

of the international community are in
asserted in

sovereignty by asserting that

peril.

is

vitiated

when

the interests

Indeed, the appellate body of the

ICTY

primacy was a functional necessity for an international

^^

The primacy of

the

ICTR was

also challenged in a case brought before

its

Trial

Chamber.''^ While taking cognizance of the fact that some of the issues raised in the

Kanyabashi Case had also been raised
"that,

jurisdiction

and

its

independence and

motion deserves a hearing and
is

one

full

in the interests

that implicitly challenged the

constitutional law in civil jurisdictions,

tried

primacy of the ICTR by contending

non evocando. This

and

an ad hoc basis that cannot guarantee a
rejected this contention

institution designed for the

it

elicits that a

when

it

fair trial in

is

that its

a notion derived from

defendant retains the right to
political courts, created

times of emergency.

opined that the 'Tribunal

is far

'^"^

The

from being an

purpose of removing, for political reasons, certain offenders

State..."

'" Brown,5Mp/-a note
1,404
v.

Kanyabashi, Case No.ICTR-96-15-T (June 18,1997)

"Md.,
For lucid reading See Virginia Morris, International Decision: Prosecutor
Case No.ICTR-96-15-T (Jun.18, 1997), 92 A.J.I.L. 66(1998)

Jurisdiction,

on

Trial

Art.2 (7) of the Charter provides that: "Nothing contained in the Present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any

"^ Prosecutor

its

of justice, the Defense Counsel's

by the regular domestic criminal courts rather than by

Chamber

this Tribunal,

consideration. ""^Amongst the objections of the

creation violated the principle of jus de

be

Tadic case, the Trial Chamber ascertained

view of the issues raised regarding the establishment of

in

defense

in the

v.

Kanyabashi, Decision on
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from

and impartial justice and have them prosecuted for

fair

political

crimes before

prejudiced arbitrators."'^^

Primacy of the international Tribunals was affirmed

in another case before the

ICTR.''^ The defendant, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, alleged to be the military brain

behind the Rwandan genocide was arrested

in the

Republic of Cameroon. The

Kingdom

of Belgium requested for Bagosora's extradition in order for him to stand

connection with the lynching of 10 Belgian paratroopers

Nations

Government
to

Mission

Assistance

also

Rwanda

in

who were

(hereinafter

its

part of the United

UNAMIR). The Rwandan
in order

They

felt that

was important

basis of

in

wanted the extradition of one of the brains behind the genocide

have a visible demonstration that justice was being done

this

trial

to the peace

in the country.

and reconciliation process. However, the ICTR on the

primacy, asserted jurisdiction over national courts and

is

now

prosecuting the

case.''^

2 - Restricting the concept of primacy: Interpretations by some

members of

the

Security Council

The

make

far-reaching effects of primacy incited

interpretive statements

states in the Security

Council to

on what they understood by the concept. There was a sense

of urgency in the Security Council
draft Statute for the

some

ICTY was

when

the Secretary General's Report containing a

presented, thus leaving very

little

time for review before

"^ See Prosecutor v Kanyabashi,at 8
"* Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora, No. ICTR-96-7-1

War Crimes

The Record And The Prospects: The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1469(1998)(See presentation on 'Concurrent jurisdiction held by
ICTR and Local Rwandan Courts' by ICTR Judge, the Honorable Navanathem Pillay). See Richard J.
Tribunals:

National Courts,13

Goldstone, For Humanity,

at

112-113 (2000)
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adoption by the Security Council.' ^^
thought

it

provisions

was necessary

for

whose scope and

them

clarity

Some permanent members
to

make

were

of the Security Council

interpretive statements to

in contention.'^

some of

the

Primacy was one of those

provisions and the United States, Britain, Russia and France (hereinafter the Big Four)

made

renditions on the scope and

meaning of primacy

as they

saw

it.

This was indeed an

attempt to restrict the notion of primacy. These four nations suggested that the Tribunal's

primacy under Article 9 para.2 of the
10 para.

2,

when

ICTY

Statute should be restricted to cases in Article

national courts are impartial, not independent, and

where the national

proceedings are a sham designed to shield the accused from international criminal

However, Rule 9

responsibility.'^^

between Articles 9

A

(2)

and 10

(iii)

unequivocally rejects the purported nexus

(2).'^'

precis of the interpretations

by the Big Four

articulates the

need for the concept

of primacy to be carefully circumscribed in the view of these nations.

Kingdom was of

the opinion that primacy

was

to

The United

be interpreted as relating, "primarily to

the courts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; elsewhere

it

will only

be

in the kinds

of exceptional circumstances outlined in Article 10,para. 2."'^^ These countries' concern

"* Scharf, supra note 58,60-63
"' See Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand

Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/PV. 3217.(1993)(hereinafter Statements from the Provisional Verbatim Record) See Scharf,supra
note 58,60-63.5ee Morris & Scharf,5M/7ra note 12,127.5ee BTOwn,supra note 1,398-399
'^ See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217
'^'
See Rule 9(iii)
'"See U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 Statements from the Provisional Verbatim Reports,supra note 97,at 18(United
Kingdom

statement.).

France was emphatic that the 'Tribunal may intervene at any stage of the procedure and assert its
primacy,including from the stage of investigations where appropriate, in the conditions covered under
Article 10 paragraph 2," Id. at

1

The United

is

States held that "it

understood that the primacy of the International Tribunal referred to in

to the situations referred to in Article 10." Id. at 16
Russia stated that the duty to "give very serious consideration to a request by the Tribunal to refer to it a
case that is being considered in a national court" is "not a duty automatically to refer the proceedings to the

paragraph 2 of Article 9 only refers

Tribunal on such a matter.A refusal to refer the case naturally has to be justified. "

Id. at

46
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was

to "avoid an arbitrary assertion of

primacy or an unnecessary encroachment upon the

sovereignty of a State in the exercise of

its

to ensure that

criminal jurisdiction;"

national courts were uniformly treated in conformity with the principle of sovereign

equality,'^"*

and

to ease coordination with the national courts

as to procedures to be followed

by providing clear guidance

by the ICTY.'^^

The question can be asked about

the probative

value of these interpretive

statements with regard to their effect on the jurisprudence of the international Tribunals

on primacy. Michael

P. Scharf,

an active participant in

this venture

on behalf of the

United States was skeptical about the fact that "the four interpretive statements were not

worded

identically and, in fact could be read quite differently."'^^ In addition to this,

attempts by the Big Four to codify the interpretive statements into the Tribunal's Rules of

Procedure and Evidence were rejected by the
Tribunal has already acknowledged that

members

to

it

ICTY

would consider renditions by Security Council

be "authoritative interpretations"

were made.'^^ Another problem

is that

Council made interpretive statements.

'^^

Judges. '^^ That said, the International

if

they were uncontested

at the

time they

only four out of fifteen members of the Security

Decisions in the Council must gamer affirmative

votes from seven of the fifteen members, subject to the veto of any permanent member.'^^

However, developments surrounding the creation of the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda

attest to the fact that

primacy of the Tribunals remain

potent and broad based inspite of attempts by the Big Four to restrict

'^^

Morris

& Scharf, supra note

its

ambit.

12,127

'^"Id.,
•^^Id.,
'^*

'"
'^^

'^'

''"

Scharf, supra note 58,61
Id. at

62

Prosecutor

v.

Tadic, Case,IT-94-I,58

BTOwn,supra note 1,401
U.N. Charter,Art.27

(ICTY Oct.2,1995) (Appeals Decision on

Jurisdiction).

The
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Statutes of the

clause.'^'

ICTY

ICTY and ICTR

While

the

ICTR

are similar but there is a

accords

its

is

The change

in

the

all

primacy

States," the

ICTR's primacy

testament to the stronger consensus on primacy that later developed within

the Security Council. '^^The change also rejects the United

Kingdom's view

only relates to national courts in the region of former Yugoslavia.

'^'

in their

"primacy over the national courts of

grants "primacy over national courts"'^^

provision

major variation

Brown, supra note 1,402

& 8(2) of ICTR,supra note 61

'^^

See Arts.9(2) of

'^^

Brown, supra note 1,402

ICTY

that

primacy

CHAPTER 3

ENFORCEMENT OF PRIMACY
A A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ICTY
-

1

- Primacy and the

Lack of enforcement

political will of states:

In an address to the U.N.General Assembly, Judge Antonio Cassese, former

President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had this to

say:

The

decisions, orders and requests of the International Tribunal can only be

enforced by others, namely national authorities. Unlike domestic criminal courts,
the Tribunal has

of national

no enforcement agencies

authorities,

evidentiary material,

it

cannot

it

disposal: without the intermediary

at its

execute

arrest

warrants;

it

cannot

cannot compel witnesses to give testimony,

it

search the scenes where the crimes have been allegedly committed. For

purposes,

it

must turn

The primacy of

to State authorities

and request them to take action.

the ad hoc Tribunals confers a strong obligation

and comply with the Tribunals regarding the

The ICTY

arrest

to

these

states to cooperate

by providing

'^^

that States, "shall

any request for assistance by the Tribunal. '^^ In the

words of Frederik Harhof, these provisions appear
'^^

all
^^"^

and surrender of accused persons.

Statute adds impetus to this mandatory edict

comply without undue delay"

on

seize

cannot

be "dramatically interventionist,

to

U.N.Doc

'^^Uaihof,supra note 10,579

Art.29 of the

ICTY

Statute in Michael Scharf,supra note 58,255

:

Cooperation and Judicial assistance

(1)

States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons

(2)

States shall

accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial

Chamber, including but not limited

the identification and location of the person;

(b)

the taking of testimony and production of evidence;

(c)

the service of documentation;

(d)

the arrest or detention of persons;

(e)

See also

to:

(a)

Art.

the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.

28 of the ICTR

Statute,

which has

identical provisions.
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making

it

more appropriate

to characterize this part of the Tribunal's jurisdiction not as

concurrent with, but superior

to,

the national jurisdiction of states."

^^^

Even though

the

Tribunal's approach to primacy has been less confrontational, Balkan States have found

it

easy enough to snub the Tribunal.
Despite the trend towards globalization and interdependence in the international
arena, the concept of national sovereignty

when

the international Tribunal tries to exercise

accused person. '*\^ss visible

momentous,
Coupled

to this is the fact that the

address,

is

a

harm

that

collusion or through

its

its

personam

in

in the Tribunal's exercise

the issue of accessing evidence

is

This assertion

is still alive.

"harm

was perpetrated
impotence."''*^

jurisdiction over an

of personal jurisdiction but

upon which

to convict indictees.^"*'

that the Tribunals are designed, in part to

hands of the State either through

at the

A

flies in the face

its

defining example of state collusion via the

destruction of evidence occurred at a site in Kossovo,

where close

to

150 Kossovo

Albanians had been killed by Serbian troops on March 28,1999,''*^ and the war crimes
Tribunal had listed the

site

as

one of the counts for the indictment of Slobodan

Milosevic.When a French forensic team arrived for an on
were no longer

there. In a race to destroy

place, the Serbs

had apparently been

site investigation, the

evidence before any war crimes

to the site

first,

trial

bodies

could take

dug up the grave and carried

the

'"Harhof,5Mpra note 10,580

Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals, in
& Kaysen eds., at 56

Richard
Sewall
'^'

J.

David A.Nill, National Sovereignty: Must

BYU J.

Pub.L.

Art. 6

of the

1

It

Be

Sacrificed

To The

International Criminal Court?, 14

19(1999)(read generally)

ICTY

Statute provides:

The

International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural

persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.

Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals fro The Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Goals and Results,3 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp. 37,38 (1999)
"^Idem
'''^
John Kiffner,"Bodies Tom From A Grave Leave A Trail of Evidence," New York Times, at A8 (June
29,1999)
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bodies elsewhere.

under

^'*^

late President

This

which the Tribunals operate. Croatia,

the environment in

is

Frandjo Tudjman''*^ blatantly refused to respect a subpoena duces

tecum of Croatian intelligence records pertinent to the

Tihomir

trial

of the Bosnian Croat General,

Blaskic.^"^^

To

ensure the effective cooperation of states with the

Council acting under

its

Charter conferred Chapter

Vn

ICTY,

powers,

the U.N.Security

made

the following

statement:

Decides that
organs

in

all

States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal

accordance

International Tribunal

with

and

present

the

that

resolution

consequently

all

and the

states shall take

and

its

of the

Statute

any measures

necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the resolution

and the

comply with requests for
Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute.''*^

Statute, including the obligation of States to

assistance or orders issued

by a

Trial

Figuring prominently amongst the international obligations and authorities to search and

arrest

war criminals within

December

the former Yugoslavia is the

14,1995.''*^ Article

"the obligation of

IX of

the Peace

Dayton Peace Accords of

Accords acknowledged and reaffirmed

Parties to cooperate in the investigation

all

and prosecution of war

crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law", while Article

Annex! -A

called

on the Parties

Goldstone, supra note

1

to "cooperate fully

17,at 94(Writing his

Tribunals, Judge Goldstone recounts

memoir about

how he avoided having

X

of

with the International Tribunal for the

the time spent as Prosecutor for ad hoc

a meeting and subsequent follow

up photo

with Frandjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic while on a working visits to Croatia and Serbia
respectively. This

was because serious criminal
by his office.)

allegations had

been made against them and they had been

the subjects of investigation

"^ Prosecutor
''*'

v.

Tihomir Blaskic,Case No.IT-95-14 (1996)

S.C. Res 827,supra note 32,at 2

See The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,50'^ Sess., Agenda Item
28,U.N.Doc. S/1995/999(Dec.l4, 1995)(After more than 3 years of diplomatic efforts by the concert of
nations and the Balkan Peace Talks held under the aegis of the U.S. in Dayton, Ohio, in November
1995.The Presidents attending were Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia Herzegovina; Frandjo Tudjman of Croatia
and Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.)(hereinafter the Dayton Peace Accords)
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Former

Yugoslavia."'"*^

estabhshed

a

At

multinational

the

behest

of the

Implementation

Parties,

Force

the

U.N. Security Council

IFOR)

(hereinafter

compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords.

IFOR was

under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter

command. The

Security Council resolution granted

force to search and arrest persons indicted

by

IFOR

is

chain of

the International Tribunal, should the

and

fail

to execute arrest

a big difference between the positive law of the United Nations

and the practice, cooperation and compliance by

their

NATO)

'^°

However, there

agency

to operate

the authority to use military

parties not fully cooperate with the International Tribunal

warrants.

ensure

to

to enforce orders

whims and

by

States.

the Tribunal gives States

The absence of an independent

some leeway

caprices vis a vis their obligations to cooperate. Matters get a bit

complicated when the Government

in

power

in a particular State is

responsible for the alleged crimes against international law. This

by the former Prosecutor

is

flatly

international scene

is

wholly or partly

the reason proffered

for the international Tribunals to describe the reluctance

states to respect their obligations

leadership

to act according to

under international law when she says that criminal

"uncooperative and obstructive, and that

where some view the concept of

blind protection regardless of what

it

is

on good days.

state sovereignty as

For a comprehensive discussion on

13(1999)

the

serves to hide, abusive and indeed criminal

this topic and international obligations to arrest war
Gary Sharp,Sr., International Obligations To Search For And Arrest War
Criminals.Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?,7 Duke J.Comp & Int'l L. 411-460
•^ S.C. Res. 1031,U.N. SCOR,50* Sess.,3607'^ mtg. para.
4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/103 1(1995)
'^'
Justice Louise Arbour,The Prosecution Of Intematioinal Crimes,! Wash. J. Urb. & Contemp. L.
Id.

On

deserving of

leadership often finds itself a bedfellow with convenience."'^*

criniinals,See Walter

by
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2 - The reaction of the Security Council

The ad hoc Tribunal

for the former Yugoslavia is a judicial

Security Council pursuant to

legally binding obligations

its

on

responsibilities under the

all

U.N. Members.

Security Council to enforce compliance of

its

It

is

body created by

the

U.N. Charter. This creates

also within the ambit of the

resolutions, especially

when

there is a

threat to international

peace and security. This has not been the case with failure by states

to cooperate with the

ICTY.This indeed

"sets a very

dangerous precedent

which the maintenance of peace has been entrusted, allows

to

if

the Council,

orders to be flouted with

its

impunity."'"

A
of

defining example of the shameful apathy and inaction by both the government

Federal

the

Republic

of

Yugoslavia

community represented by NATO,
Radovan Karadzic and

leader

warrants

empowered IFOR

is

(hereinafter

the failure to arrest

FRY) and

promptly with

international

and transfer the Bosnian Serb

Ratko Mladic. '^^ The

his military counterpart General

to "act

the

due diligence to secure the

all

arrest

and transfer of Karadzic and Mladic to the Tribunal. "'^'^ Indeed the raison d'etre of an
international arrest warrant to all states is to

give effect to the arrest warrant given to

overcome

it.'^^ If

the failure of an individual state to

a Trial

Chamber

certifies that a state has

Benjamin B. Ferencz.International Criminal Courts:The Legacy Of Nuremberg, 10 Pace

Int'l

L.

203(1998)
'" International Arrest Warrant and Order for the Surrender.Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61

/

IT-95-18-R61 (July

11,1996)
'^Id..
'^^

Sharp, supra note 149,at 448-449(Rules 54-61 of RPE governs procedures for orders and warrants.

There

is

a fine difference

between an

indictment, the prosecutor

and

is

may

"arrest warrant"

and an "international

arrest warrant'. Pursuant to

seek an arrest warrant pursuant to Rule 55 that

was

last

known

requesting the "State to which a warrant of arrest

in

to be... "Rule
...is

an

signed by a single judge

whose territory or under whose jurisdiction
56 re-emphasizes the obligation of states by
transmitted shall act promptly and with all due

only addressed to the "national authorities of the State

or control the accused resides,or

is
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failed to fulfill its obligations within the

framework of an international

arrest warrant,

then such a failure will be reported to the Security Council, which can take the necessary

enforcement measures to force the

"How
that recounts

Paris,

NATO

military

state to

comply.

not to catch a war criminal,"

how some few months

is

after the

'^^

the captivating caption

Dayton Accords were formally signed

troops learned of the presence of indicted

complex they were scheduled

arresting him.

to inspect

war criminal Ratko Mladic

and the troops decided

There are also accounts of how

Karadzic to pass unhindered via

by one newspaper

NATO

to desist

troops permitted

in

in a

from

Radovan

NATO checkpoints.'^^

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska have

persistently

refused to comply with orders for arrests and transfer of indictees to the ICTY,

contending that they are constitutionally stymied from doing so.'^^ Instances abound

where the Serbian Government has defied the
practice evaporating.

The

conflict in

ICTY and

there are

this

Kossovo gave the Serbian Government another

opportunity for noncompliance with Security Council edicts. '^^
jurisdiction over the heinous

no signs of

war crimes committed

in

The Hague Tribunal has

Kossovo pursuant

to three specific

Security Council.'^* Justice Louise Arbour wrote a letter to former Serbian president

Slobodan Milosevic, requesting access to Kossovo for on-site investigations

that are

diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof,in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute."

Rule 61 permits the Trial Chamber to issue an international warrant addressed to all states.
''*RPE 61(E)
'" Colin Soloway & Stephen Hedges,"How Not to Catch.a War
Criminal," U.S News and World Report,

at

63(Dec.9, 1996).

Dean Murphy, "Bosnia Pact Reported on War Crimes," Boston Globe, at 2(Feb.l3, 1996)
"' For more detail, see Hazel Fox, The Objections to the Transfer
of Criminal Jurisdiction to the
Tribunal,46 Int'l
Comp. L. Q.434 (1997). See also Sean Murphy, supra note 98,at 65.See Ferencz,supra

UN

&

note 152,222

Sewall
'*'

Id.

& Kaysen eds.„ supra note 26,at 57
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indispensable to the Tribunal's work. Arbour was granted a seven-day single entry visa

and was admonished

that she

not granted visas.

The most notorious

which spurred

had no

right to

go to Kossvo, whilst much of her team were

incident

NATO to take action against Serbia.

was

macabre discovery

In January 1999,

access to Kossovo and the scene of the massacre, but

by Belgrade.

the

Arbour

at

Racak,

tried to gain

was unceremoniously turned back

'^^

This non-compliance with binding resolutions of the United Nations Security

Council has been met with

action

little

enforce primacy and by that token,

from the

its

own

latter.

authority

Council has yet to take action to
is

being directly challenged by

rogue States. Such heel dragging and outright obstruction could be ominous for the future
International Criminal Court,

if

allowed to prevail. This sends an unequivocal message to

recalcitrant states that they can violate international

law and Security Council resolutions

with impunity. Such lethargy by the Security Council incited the then President of the

ICTY, Judge Antonio Cassese,
war crimes

leaders indicted for

Security Council to close

to give a

in

down

one year ultimatum to Western

states to arrest

Bosnia, or he and his colleagues "will propose to the
the Tribunal because

it

is

becoming an exercise

in

hypocrisy."'^^

A

former top

has in a clarion

call

official

asked

of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

IFOR

to

abandon

a robust "seek and detain" policy. '^^

NATO,

by

its

mantra of "monitor, but don't touch" for

The justification proffered

for the cautious approach

hinges on the fear that arresting the principal Serb indictees could shatter the

'"Id.
'" Id.

See Robert Marquand, Bosnia

War Crime Judge Talks

of Quitting, Christian Science Monitor.at

l(Oct.22,1996). See also Walter Sharp,supra note 135,452
'^^

James A.Goldstone, Crime

Still

Pays

in

Bosnia, Wall

St. J.,at

A20 (Nov26,1996)
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fragile

peace in the Balkans and lead to escalation. ^^^ This, alongside risks of

casualties

on the side of

independent,

fair

NATO

nations are legitimate fears. However, the search for an

and effective international system of criminal justice "must be

safeguarded from the vagaries of realpolitik. Compromise
justice."'^^The failure

author to say

human

by the Security Council

is

to enforce its

the art of politics, not of

own

orders has incited one

:

This has created a deplorable gap between the theoretically binding nature of the
Tribunal's primacy and the de facto limitation of that primacy to cases of

voluntary state cooperation. This lack of political support leaves the Tribunal

unable to enforce even this most basic aspect of

weak

its

jurisdiction-a fundamentally

position by any standard.

This section of the paper depicts that the most important barriers to the creation of a
viable and sustainable international criminal system are state sovereignty

cooperation.

The

and lack of

lack of political will and the failure of the Security Council to enforce

its

own mandate

3

Concurrent jurisdiction dilemma: The Case of Slobodan Milosevic

i

-

state

could perpetuate these obstacles.

- Background History
In an unprecedented

move

that constitutes a

the prosecution of alleged violators of international law,

Arbour indicted the President of

See Retiring

NATO Commander Says Politics

'^^

Bassiouni,5Mpra note 35,12-13

'^*

BTOwn,supra note

1, at

411

ICTY

Prosecutor Justice Louise

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Helps Keep Bosnian

Result in Serbian Unrest, Disrupted Elections, Baltimore Sun, at

movement towards

milestone in the

A13

War

Slobodan Milosevic

Criminals Free: Arrests Could

(July 13,1996)
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and top

officials of the

FRY/^^for egregious and heinous crimes committed

in the

name

'^'^
The indictment that was confirmed by
of ethnic cleansing against Kossovo Albanians.

Judge Hunt, alleged amongst other issues
operations

...these

that:

Kossovo Albanians were undertaken with the
substantial portion of the Kossovo Albanian population

targeting

objective of removing a

from Kossovo, in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province.
If these pleaded facts are accepted, they establish that the forces from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia persecuted the Kossovo Albanian civilian
population on political, racial or religious grounds, and that there was both
deportation and murder, constituting crimes against humanity and violations of
the laws or customs of war.

The Prosecutor had

to establish

a

prima facie case against the accused persons

conformity with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal.

'^^

in

In providing the

requisite causal link necessary for the indictment to pass muster before a Trial

Chamber

Judge, the Prosecutor established that Milosevic was both the President and Supreme

Commander
to

of the

Armed

Forces of the Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to his power

implement the National Defense Plan, Milosevic's position

connected him to the alleged crimes.

The Milosevic case

agenda when

it

comes

to

htmus

test for the

legitimacy of the

war crimes. Eventhough

primacy over national courts,

tribunals talk about their

chain of

command,

'^^

constitutes a

resolve to prosecute and punish

in the

ICTY and its

the Statutes of the ad

states usually

implementing international law. "Sovereignty

have
is

their

hoc

own

frequently the

v. Slobodan MiIosevic,Milan Milutinovic,Nikola Sainovic,Dragoljub Ojdanic & Vlajko
No. IT-99-33 JDecision on Review of Indictment And Application For Consequential

The Prosecutor
Stojiljo vie, Case

Orders (May 27,1999)(hereinafter The Prosecutor v. Milosevic)
William Miller.Slobodan Milosevic's Prosecution By The International Criminal Tribunal For The
Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger Of Things To Come For International Criminal Justice,22 Loy. L.A. Int'l

& Comp.
171

L. Rev.

Prosecutor

v.

553(2000)

Milosevic, supra note 169, para.8

'"Id.
"^ See supra note 169,para
10(1)
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justification for states to

demand

non intervention of other

the

states in matters they

consider to be exclusively within their domestic jurisdiction."'^'* This assertion

the

in

the matter

is

Primacy of the international tribunals notwithstanding, the crux of

that "international

law has not yet developed a comprehensive

defining with reasonable precision

and other international

As seen
the

earlier

primacy of the

between

link

when

on

ICTY

politics

all

forms of jurisdiction that

legal persons.

in this paper,

over

its

it

may be

is

is

no secret

the issue of political will

exercised by

that Serbia is a persistent objector to

national jurisdiction.'^^ In addition, there

Head of

a sitting

set of rules

"'^^

and the implementation of international law by

the principal accused

makes

relevant

realm of concurrent jurisdiction, where the protagonists are states and an

international tribunal.

states

is

State as

was

is

a very close

states, especially

the case with Milosevic.This

very pertinent through out this discourse. Prior to

Milosevic's formal indictment, the Dayton Peace Accords whose objective was to quell
the fighting and bring a long lasting peace to the Balkans

was

a bit complacent with the

Serbian leader. Milosevic was granted de facto immunity in exchange of his signature on
the

Dayton Peace Accords. However,

ensued negated

this

immunity

in the

his military actions

and the heinous crimes

that

eyes of the international community. That said, he

continued to rule with impunity as long as he did not venture out of the confines of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and there was no enforcement agency to compel

him

to

submit to the jurisdiction of the ICTY.

Anne Bodley, Weakening
for the

at 421
See supra note 56

'"id.
'

*

the Principle of Sovereignty in International

Former Yugoslavia.30 N.J.U.

J.Int'l L.

& Pol.

417,421()

Law: The

International Tribunal
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ii

- The

arrest

and

feasibility of

a Milosevic deferral to the

Following turbulent presidential elections
defeated Slobodan Milosevic to

of the

new regime

to arrest

become

the

new

ICTY

Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica

in

Rumours abounded of the

leader.

desire

and prosecute Milosevic for the crimes committed during

his

tenure at the helm of the Yugoslav nation. Events took a sudden turn for the worst and

after a standoff with security forces,

Milosevic voluntarily surrendered and was taken

'^^
Milosevic
into custody at the Belgrade central prison.

was indicted on 'grounded

suspicion' that he "committed crimes with the intention of securing benefits for himself

and a

certain

number of persons,

to secure to his

SPS

party property and other benefits
1

with the aim of preserving that political party

in

TO

power."

After the arrest of the once redoubtable dictator, expectations were very high in

the international legal

The Hague

community of

the

imminent transfer or deferral of Milosevic

to stand trial for crimes against

humanity as contained

in the indictment

issued by the Prosecutor of the ICTY.'^^ However, Belgrade manifested

surrendering Milosevic to the

ICTY.The Serbian

Interior Minister,

to

little

hurry in

Dusan Mihajlovic

succinctly said that Yugoslav citizens could not be amenable to extradition until a law

was passed on cooperation with
ally

I

the

war crimes Tribunal.

fin

and an erstwhile supporter of Milosevic, described the

internal matter for Yugoslavia.'^'

Irena Guzelova

It is

Russia, Serbia's strongest

arrest as an exclusively

important to note that Serbs think the

& Staefan Wagstyl, "Serb Rulers Hope Arrest will

ICTY

Secure Support,"Financial Times,

is

at

2(Apr.2, 2001)
'^

See supra note 169
Stefan Wagstyl

l(Apr.2, 2001)
'»'

Id..

& Irena Guzelova,"West presses for Milosevic to face war tribunal," Financial Times, at

I
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biased and they are victims of the leverage the West exerts in international

is

affairs.

There

indeed some pertinence in the Serbian position when one considers the fact that no

NATO

soldier or official has been indicted to this day, despite allegations of crimes

against international humanitarian law

committed during

NATO's bombing campaign

against Serbia.

Subsequent to the 1999

NATO

bombing of Yugoslavia, some pressure groups

including Russian parliamentarians and North American law professors, '^^ requested the

ICTY

to investigate

law.'^'^The

into

ICTY

whether

NATO

had indeed committed crimes against humanitarian

Prosecutor decided that there was "no basis for opening an investigation

any of the allegations or into other incidents related

holding

is

to the

reminiscent of one of the criticisms that tainted the

NATO bombings."' ^^This
Nuremberg

Trials as being

justice of the victors over the vanquished, especially after the Allied

bombing of

German town

the fact that the

ICTY

of Dresden went unpunished.

Worthy of note however,

is

the

Prosecutor premised her conclusion on the contention that "there was no deliberate

targeting

of civilians or unlawful

campaign. "'^^ However, Serbs are

The Milosevic Case

military

still

targets

by

NATO

during the bombing

skeptical about the Prosecutor's findings.

depicts the clash

between the jurisdiction of

states

to

prosecute their nationals and the jurisdiction of international tribunals to try these same
nationals for crimes

against international law.

becomes more contentious when
'*^

Barbara Crosette,"U.N.

War Crimes

The concurrent

jurisdiction

scenario

the primacy of the international tribunals is asserted vis

Prosecutor Declines

To

Investigate

NATO," New York Times,3

June,2000,at 4

See

http: jurist.law.pitt.edu/kossovo.htm

(Kossovo

& Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis.A presentation of

JURIST: The law professor's network)
Sarah B. Kewall, Carl Kaysen,
Court:
IOC

An

Overview,

in

SewalJ

&

& Michael P.Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal
Kaysen eds.„at 16

See Crosette, supra note 187, at 4
'«^Id.

"^
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a vis a state

which has persistently objected

his pohtical demise, there are

to

answer on war crimes.

Serbian courts

is

the

many

Many

who

Serbs

forum conveniens

Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica,

contest the fact that Milosevic has a case

also refuse to

acknowledge

for hearing

these

that the

war crimes

not

allegations.

President of the Federal Republic of

who made no

secret of his reluctance to extradite

Milosevic to The Hague, preferring a

is

the

trial in

view of one author, while

Serbia.

'^^

"states' refusal to

comply with requests

problem for the International Tribunal,

deferral has not materialized as a

ICTY and

new

Prominent amongst these contestants

In the

to the latter's superior jurisdiction. Inspite of

for

their failure to

execute arrest warrants has emerged as the single greatest obstacle to the tribunal's

success."

The

and procedures of the Tribunal depend not only upon the

rules

cooperation of states but also upon the support of the Security Council to enforce that

and drafting an indictment, the Tribunal's

After investigating a case

cooperation.

Prosecutor must present that indictment to one of the Tribunal's Judges for review and
1

confirmation.

RO

Upon confirming

the indictment, the judge issues warrants for the arrest

of the accused and an order for his surrender to the Tribunal. '^°These warrants are then
transmitted to the state where the accused

The standoff between
feasibility of bringing

The outcome of

'^^

Brown, supra note
ICTY, RPE 47
'^
Id. RPE 55(B)
'^'

Id.,

Serbia raises the pertinent issue of the

ICTY

to

answer questions on his international

this jurisdictional conflict will

Guzelova,"No Plans To Extradite Milosevic But Charges Rise

2(Apr.2, 2001)
'*''

suspected to be seeking refuge.'^'

ICTY and

Milosevic before the

criminal responsibility.

Irena

the

is

1, at

413

at

Home,"

go a long way

Financial Times, at

to
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enhance or diminish the legitimacy of the
to prosecute, punish

ICTY and

the Security Council in their crusade

and enforce international humanitarian law. International law as

articulated in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals enunciates that the jurisdiction of the

ICTY

trumps that of Serbia with regard to the prosecution of Milosevic.lt

is

on

this

premise that the president of the ICTY, Judge Claude Jorda, and the Prosecutor, Carla del
Ponte, reminded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of

transfer Milosevic to the

of the ICTY, paid a

ICTY

visit to

"with

all

order to ensure that
those states which

the international

should engage

international

its

to flout edicts of the Security Council

the requisite political will in

orders are obeyed and effective penalties are enforced against

fail to

meet

their obligations

present 'wait and see' policy.

The

under international law. With Milosevic,

to wait.

more robust approach and

gives the international

The Hague.

community must gamer

community was ready

in a

the Registrar

Serbia in order to serve a warrant of arrest on Milosevic, as

Renegade regimes must not be allowed

The

"absolute obligation" to

Hans Holthuis,

due diligence."

well as arrange modalities for his smooth transfer to

with impunity.

its

However, the

exert

more pressure on Serbia

fact that Serbia relies

community much leverage

international

to

community
in lieu

of

its

on the West for economic aid

impose stringent conditions and

pressure on the former. Thus, the decision by the Congress of the United States of

America

to tie aid to Serbia with the latter' s cooperation with the

and laudable.

ICTY

is

both effective

'^^

192

http://www.un.org/ictv/pressreal/p 584-e.htm (Visited on May 21,2001)
"^ Fiscal 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (Public Law
106-429) (adopted on Oct.25, 2000),

See also 2000 Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Weekly, vol. 58, No. 42,at 2552-2554 (Oct.28, 2000)
March 31^', 2001, was the date set by the United States Congress as deadline by which the US
Administration was required to judge whether Belgrade was cooperating or not with the ICTY. See also
Stefan Wagstyl & Irena Guzelova,"US extends aid to Belgrade," Financial Times, at 16 (Apr.3, 2001)
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A

provision in the U.S. Senate's Fiscal 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations

Bill stipulates to cut

Worid Bank and

The Hague

up

to $

100 million

Serbia and end U.S. support for

other loans, unless Belgrade cooperates with the

(ICTY).'^'* U.S.

The Serbian Government
with the

War Crimes

Tribunal

at

lawmakers had given a short moratorium on implementing

the restrictions, in order to allow the

cooperation

in U.S. aid to

reacted

ICTY by

new Kostunica regime time

to consolidate power.

on the eve of the deadline for certification of

arresting

Milosevic.However, they eschewed more

substantive actions, particularly the court's order for the extradition of former Yugoslav

strongman Slobodan Milosevic. '^^ Even Senator Zoran Voinovich, R-Ohio,

who

of Serbian descent, conveyed in unequivocal terms the message to Belgrade

when he

that

it

"is in the

got to hold

is

partly

said

hands of the Yugoslav government and the Serbian Government... We've

them

to the requirements.

We've

got to incentivize a course correction, not

the corrupt status quo."'^^

The economico-financial leverage exerted by
example of

the kind of resolve the international

the U.S. Congress

is

community should wield on

a defining

states that

renege on their international obligations like Yugoslavia. This indeed has had far
reaching effects in the case of

West

to

show

real

Mi lose vie. Under

cooperation

with the

intense and persistent pressure from the

ICTY ahead

of an international donors

conference for Yugoslavia,'^^ the Yugoslav Cabinet adopted a decree on Saturday, June

23,on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

Miles A. Pomper,"Macedonian Unrest, Serbian Aid Force a Renewed Focus on Balkans", 2001
Weekly, vol. 59 No.l2,at 676-677 (Mar.24,2001)
'"Md.,

"^Id.,

Conference scheduled on June, 29,2001 in Brussels, Belgium.
"* Reuters, June 23,2001

CQ

^^^
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way

This was expected to pave the

for the

Milosevic.The decree took effect a day after
Gazette, and

is

subject to appeal.

A

it

handover of war crimes suspects

was pubhshed

in the

like

Yugoslav Official

flashback of events ehcits that the Yugoslav

Parliament had postponed discussions on a

bill

enabling cooperation with the ICTY,

while the ruling coalition tried to resolve internal differences on the matter. '^^ However,
the

coalition's junior

partner

and former

ally

of Milosevic's

Montenegrin Socialist Peoples' Party (hereinafter SNP), vowed
that advocates cooperation with the

ICTY. Serbia's

partner in the coalition needed the support of the

crucial to securing badly

A
trained

other

DOS

SNP

Yugoslavia

the

"should

the

any law

Alliance, the senior

which

to pass the law,

is

seen as

needed Western funds for Yugoslavia.

Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic stated clearly
if

Party,

to vote against

Reform

strong advocate for reform and cooperation with the

means

Socialist

measure did not pass
not

delay

in

Serbia's western

that the reformers

parliament.

meeting the

ICTY,

He was

international

regardless of whether the law on cooperation with the

would

of the opinion that

community's conditions,

Hague Tribunal

agenda of the Federal pariiament or not."^°'He implored

resort to

will be

on the

his colleagues to reflect

on the

specter of 10 million people paying the price for protecting Milosevic.

Milosevic's

defense

team

immediately

lodged

an

appeal

to

Yugoslavia's

Constitutional Court contesting the validity of the decree. ^^^The defense contended that

the decree did not pass muster under the

extradition of

20.

202

Yugoslav

citizens.

Yugoslav constitution, which proscribes the

The reformers on

the other

hand argued

jj

Jovana Gec,"Milosevic Files Extradition Challenge," Associated Press (Jun.25,2001)

that

handing a
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suspect over to the

ICTY

does not amount to an extradition, as the Tribunal

Nations body and not a foreign

state.

The Yugoslav

Justice Minister,

expressed confidence that the decree would pass muster because

which

the Constitution

Toma

it

"in line with part of

defendant qualified the decree as "legal piracy" and

a "political decision and

is

Momcilo Grubac,

stipulates respect for all established international obligations."

Fila, lead attorney for the

alleged that

it is

a United

is

it

renders the law helpless against such bullying

methods."^^

Although

this trier

of fact

is

of the opinion that the decree

is

premised on

political

expediency rather than firm legal predicate, the possibility of deferrals from Yugoslavia
to

The Hague

constitutes

a

momentous

to object to a particular case.^^^ Yugoslavia's

pro-democracy leader

when confronted on

went against the Constitution but

one."

The

government,

international

until

international

Governments of Serbia

Vojislav Kostunica,

it

The decree permits

law,

the

pressure and the crusade against impunity.

and Montenegro

victory for international

the legality of the decree

said, "out

community did not

Milosevic

is

deferred to

of international law were served.

was of

the opinion that

of two evils, the country chose the lesser
relent in exerting pressure

The Hague

for

trial.

The road from Belgrade

to

By

on the Serbian

so doing, the interests

The Hague

is

long and

plagued with legal conundrums and intricate wranglings, but the international community
should stay resolved in bringing an end to impunity.

On
28,2001.

a day of fast breaking news, two important events occurred on Thursday, June

First, the

Constitutional Court temporarily stalled the federal extradition decree

^" Reutersjune 25,2001
Jovami,supra note 202
^"^

Katarina Kratovac,"Ministry wants Milosevic Extradited", AP, June 25,2001
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that

would have cleared the way

constitutionality of the fiat.^^^

contumacy by the reformers
that the decision

for Milosevic's transfer, pending

in the Serbian

Prime Minister, Korac, called the decision

by saying

last year's elections,

that

its

It is

government. The Serb Prime Minister said

the Judges

a

were Milosevic appointees. ^°^ Vice

parody of justice and went forth to indict the

presiding Judge

which eventually led

toppled Milosevic. ^^^

decision on the

The Court's preliminary decision was received with

was "worthless" because

integrity of the Court

its

to the

was

the

same who had

nullified

popular uprising of October 2000, that

clear that the judicial transition

from the Milosevic era

to

one

of democracy has not occurred.

Then

in a

sudden volte-face, came the breaking news

been spirited to U.N. authorities

Hague

to

stand

genocide.

trial

The

in the

for crimes

deferral

that

Slobodan Milosevic had

Bosnian town of Tuzla, and was on his way to The

against humanity,

humanitarian law and possibly

of the erstwhile president was effectuated pursuant to an

extraordinary meeting of the Serbian Government, called to discuss the earlier ruling of

the Constitutional

Court.

The Serb Prime

Milosevic foe, seems to be the

dynamo

Minister,

Zoran Djindjic, a renowned

or instigator of the transfer of Milosevic.He

apparently ignored the Constitutional Court's decision, and in what appears to be a

growing

rift

with the Federal President Kostunica, reports allege that the

informed by Djindjic of the imminence of the

deferral.

^'^

.

'"'Id.,
210

http://www.bbc.co.uk "Milosevic extradited"(cite visited on July 28,2001)
.

Id.,

'•^Id..

was not

Djindjic relied on a clause

^^ Aleksandar Vasovic,"Milosevic Extradition Decree Suspended," AP (June 28,2001)
^°^
http://www.cnn.com/world "Milosevic in U.N. custody" (cite visited on July 28,2001)

'"

latter
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inserted into the Serbian Constitution

by erstwhile President Milosevic, which provided

that Serbia's interests supersede those of the

However, an issue which cannot be
Milosevic

saga

is

the

Govemment.Milosevic's

extra

surreal

lost

pressure

handover

Yugoslav federation.
even on the inadvertent onlooker

U.N.

to the

Yugoslavia

on

exerted

War Crimes

barely a day before an international donor conference

was held

The U.S. made

the transfer of chief

U.S.

the

Tribunal happened
in Brussels,

Belgrade was expecting to secure a billion dollars, necessary to salvage
dire straits.

by

in the

war crimes suspects

its

where

economy

in

like Milosevic, a

condition sine qua non for the release of funds and that was not lost on the Yugoslavs.

However, the timing of

his snap deferral to

The Hague

left

many

Serbs thinking

he was sold for money. This sparked off demonstrations where the West was denigrated,

and the hand over of Milosevic was described as an act of treason. This minority
that Serbia lost its national pride in the venture. In

crisis that

what seems to be a budding

feels

political

could threaten the very fabric of the Yugoslav Federation, the Yugoslav Prime

Minister, Zoran Zizic, considering the deferral "illegal and unconstitutional," resigned in

and was followed

protest

suit

by the Montenegrin

when

defining example of the acrimony engendered

sovereignty

is

impugned by an imperious ICTY

However,

become
very

the arrest of Milosevic,

politically irrelevant,

much

alive. In the

allies

of Milosevic.^^^ This indeed

is

a State has the impression that

that is influenced

Milosevic case, there was no

after the latter

that national sovereignty is

way

its

by the West.

which was effectuated only

compels the conclusion

a

had
still

international law could be

enforced so long as he was the Head of State and refused to cooperate or recognize the
legitimacy of the ICTY. Whether or not this
^'^

Dusan Stojanovic, "Yugoslav Prime Minister Resigns,"

is

AP

ominous, or a harbinger of what
(July 29,2001)

is
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reserved for the permanent International Criminal Court, remains to be seen.
these international judicial bodies do not have their

The

fact that

own independent enforcement

agencies means that such standoffs are conceivable in the case of the International

Criminal Court. With the final transfer of Milosevic to The Hague, he becomes the

Head of
trial

U.N.

State to be indicted while in office,

before the ICTY.

He

War Crimes Tribunal

moment

is

and the

first

former Head of State to stand

indeed the ICTY's biggest prize.

said that

it is

for the life of the institution.

A

"an extraordinary moment.

The message

is clear...

law, no matter what position he held."^''* However, the

No

ICTY

Ponte, was quick to emphasize that Milosevic,s presence at

spokesperson for the

It is

a very important

individual

is

one of the top

the "Butcher of the Balkans." Perpetual fugitives

is

above the

Prosecutor, Carla Del

The Hague should

overshadow the absence of other indicted war criminals. Paradoxically.this
Milan Milutinovic, President of Serbia, who

first

is

not

the case of

officials indicted alongside

on the ICTY's most wanted

Radovan Karadzic and Radko Mladic aka "Butcher of Srebrenica" have

all

list

like

gone into

hiding once more. The International community should not relent until these criminals
are arrested

^'^Id.

and deferred

to the

ICTY.

CHAPTER 4
THE PERILS OF PRIMACY
A A CLOSER LOOK AT THE ICTR
-

1

-

Surrender of the accused or extradition?

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana

As seen

v.

Janet Reno et

:

The case of

al.^'^

in preceding parts of this thesis, the

primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals over

national judiciaries confer a strong obligation on states to cooperate with the Tribunals

regarding the arrest and surrender of accused persons. There
fact that the Statutes' provisions

states,

no contention about the

on primacy are compelling and mandatory vis a vis

which can also exercise jurisdiction on a concurrent

basis. Pursuant to an order

a judge of the Tribunal for the surrender of an accused person

state, the

is

who

is in

the custody of a

Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that the obligations laid

Article 28 of the

ICTR

Statute "shall prevail over any legal

may

exist under the

this area

states are reluctant to defer to the Tribunals' edicts in the

legislation.

^'^

To

this effect, several states including the

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana

v.

is

part of the

of the law

elicits that

absence of implementing

United States of America have

Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States; Madeleine Albright,

Secretary of State of the United States; Juan Garza, Sheriff of Webb County,Texas,184 F.3d 419

1999)
^'^

Rule 58 (See supra note 125 for the provisions of Art.28 of TCTR Statute)
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in

to the surrender

national law or extradition treaties of the State concemed."^'^ Extradition

and an exegesis of

down

impediment

or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which

fabric of a state's judicial sovereignty

by

(5*^ Cir.

52

^^^
Other
enacted national legislation allowing them to transfer indictees to the Tribunals.

T

1

Montenegro

and

Serbia

like

states

say

transferring

nationals

ICTY

the

to

is

Q

unconstitutional.

In the realm of the

ICTR,

the Ntakirutimana case

is

instructive of the clash

between national judicial sovereignty as exercised by local courts and the primacy
jurisdiction of the international Tribunals.

more of an exercise

way

to

in

US

the trier of fact might think this case

constitutional law rather than international law,

it

have concurrent jurisdiction and both would

right of jurisdiction. Inspite of the

goes a long

The

if its

defendant, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana

dominant Hutu

tribe

it

is

plan to encourage

alleged that he

members of
Once

church complex.

is

actions imperil international law.

a

Rwandan

citizen, a

member

prefecture. In

217

was responsible

for the preparation

the

Tutsis

were slaughtered.

legally residing with his son in Laredo, Texas.

(5*^ Cir.

1999)

in

and execution of a

the minority Tutsi tribe to seek refuge in the

there,

Murphy, supra note 98,at 64

^" 184 F.3d 419,at 422
^^^
Id, at 423

of the

one of the two indictments issued

A

Mugonero

Tribunal's

confirmed his indictment and issued a warrant for the arrest of Ntakirutimana

Rwanda and was

latter

and was President of the Seventh Day Adventist Church

Mugonero, Gishyita commune, Kibuye
by the ICTR,

like to exercise this

primacy of the Tribunals over national courts, the

not always ready to yield to the former, even

left

is

explain the tensions that stem from the fact that national courts and the

international Tribunals

is

Though

^^^

Judge

who had

)
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Pursuant to the ICTR's request for the arrest and surrender of Ntakirutimana,

Government

the United States Federal

District

Court of Texas,^^^

Government and

the ICTR.^^^

in

The Magistrate Judge

government's request on the grounds

in

Texas, serving as judicial officer,

He premised

that the congressionally

Law 104-106

of 1996

historical practice, extradition requires a treaty.

for surrender,

is

denial

and

that

based on

held alternatively that the request

and the supporting documents did not establish probable cause

Magistrate Judge, the Government refiled

Judge

in the

same court.^^^The

its

to support

The Prosecutor

v.

by the

request for surrender seeking review by a

district court certified the

surrender to the ICTR,

concurring with the Government's contention that the Agreement and Public
^^'

of the

mandated National Defence

unconstitutional,

He

his

the charges against the indictee. ^^^ In order to address the evidentiary issue raised

different

US

conformity with the "Agreement" between the

denied the Government's request for surrender.^^'*

Authorization Act or Public

United States

filed a request to that effect in the

Law

104-

Ntakirutimana,No. ICTR-96-17-1, Warrant of Arrest and Order for Surrender (Sept.7,

1996) The warrant reads in pertinent part

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

.

that: "I,

Judge WilHam H.Sekule, Judge of the International

.HEREBY DIRECT

America
Rwanda: Elizaphan

the Authorities of the United States of

search for, arrest and surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal for

to

who is currently believed to be in the United States of America."
"^ Re Surrender of Ntakirutimana,988 F.Supp.l038 (S.D.Tex. 1997)

Ntakirutimana.

.

.

In 1995, the President of the United States entered into an executive agreement with the ICTR entitled
"Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United States and the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide
and other such Violations committed in the Territory of Neighboring States,"( Agreement) U.S.-Int'l Trib.
Rwanda,1996 WL 165484 (Treaty) (Jan.24,1995); In 1996,Congress enacted Public Law 104-106 to
implement the Agreement. See National Defense Authorization Act,Pub.L. 104-106, §1342,1 10 Stat.486
(1996). § 1342(a)(1) of this legislation provides that the federal extradition statutes (18 U.S.C. § 3181 et
seq.) shall apply to the surrender of persons to the ICTR.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 authorizes a judicial officer to hold a hearing to consider a request for surrender. If he
finds the evidence sufficient enough to sustain the charges under the treaty or convention, then he certifies
to the Secretary of State that the person can be surrendered. (§ 3186 confers on Secretary of State final
authority to surrender fugitive after determination by judicial officer.

^" Re Surrender of Ntakirutimana,988F.Supp,at 1042
Panayiota Alexandropoulos,Enforceability of Executive-Congressional Agreements In Lieu Of An
Article II Treaty For Purposes Of Extradition: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno,45 Vill. L. Rev.
107(2000) (A comprehensive account of the case and US constitutional issues regarding extradition)

The Government did not appeal
U.S.C. § 1291.

the request because extradition decisions are not appealable under

28

54

106, provide a constitutional basis for Ntakirutimana's extradition to the

found

that the Constitution sets forth

Supreme Court has indicated
and

that there is precedent

"filled the

gap"

left

by a

its

no

ICTR.The

court

specific requirements for extradition; that the

approval of extraditions

made

in the

absence of a

treaty,

wherein fugitives were extradited pursuant to statutes that

treaty provision.^^^

The

court also held that the evidence sufficed

to establish probable cause. Ntakirutimana filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the

district court's grant

down

court turned

of the government's second request for surrender.^^^

his petition, of

Appeals for the Fifth

issues,

certification of extraditability to the

II

to the

district

United States Court of

Circuit.^^^

Contending amongst other

under Article

which he appealed

The

Ntakirutimana alleged that the

ICTR on

district court's

the basis of a Statute did not pass muster

of the Constitution of the United States, since the latter requires an

extradition to occur pursuant to a treaty.^^' Since this represented a challenge to the

jurisdiction

of

the

committing

court,

the

Fifth

Circuit

constitutionahty of Ntakirutimana's extradition de novo.

to a

Supreme Court

decision,

The

decided

Fifth Circuit

to

review

made

the

reference

which supports the constitutionality of using Executive-

Congressional Agreement to extradite Ntakirutimana.^^^ Even the "last in time rule"

contemplates that a statute and a treaty

^^*

may

cover the same subject matter, as was the

Re Surrender of Ntakiritimana,No. CIV. A. L-98-43,1998
^^'28^5.0. §2241

WL 655708,at 9,17(S.D. Tex. Aug.6,1998)

^" Ntakirutimana,184F. 3d419
U.S. Const,

art. II,

§ 2,cl. 2 that

enumerates the President's foreign relations power provides

"the President shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to

make

"(This provision does not refer either to extradition or the necessity of a treaty to extradite.)

"^ Valentine

v.

United States,299 U.S. 5 (1936)

in part that

Treaties...
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dictum in a Supreme Court case where

one

last in

it

was held

that "if the

The

district court,

was one

Circuit court held that the matter

which had

earlier

found

when

district court erred

habeas corpus petition because the request for surrender
^^'*

are inconsistent, the

date will control the other."^^^

Ntakirutimana also contends that the

cause.

two

that there

to

fails

it

dismissed his

to establish

probable

be decided by the committing

was indeed probable cause. Accordingly,

the Fifth circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Ntakirutimana' s petition

for writ of habeas corpus, and

by

that token

concurred with the lower court's certification

of extraditability.^^^
In

his

historically,

dissenting

opinion.

an extradition agreement

Treaty Clause. ^^^xtradition which

is

Circuit

is

found

Judge

DeMoss,

in a treaty

fervently

asserts

that

and therefore governed by the

defined as "the surrender by one nation to another

of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of

its

own

territory,

and

within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which being competent to try and punish,

demands

the surrender."

Judge DeMoss goes forth

to say that until the advent of the ad

hoc Tribunals, every extradition agreement entered into by the

US

has been by treaty.

He

also argues that the original extradition statutes, enacted in 1848,required the existence of

an extradition treaty and there was no exception

Defense Authorization Act.^^^ The terse message
Tribunal

is

Id. at

enactment of the National

in the dissent is that the international

not a sovereign nation and thus lacks the locus standi to enter into a treaty

^" Whitney v. Robertson,124 U.S.
190(1888)
"" Natkirutimana,184 F. 3d,427
^^^

until the

430

"^ Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d,at 436
"^ Terlinden v. Ames, 1 84 U.S. 270,289(1902)
"* Ntakirutimana, 184 F. 3d,436
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with

nation

sovereign

a

international law recognize

Some
Case

set

no

United

the

like

Furthermore,

States.

right to extradition apart

from

Executive-Congressional Agreement with the

ruling on the issue of probable cause

was

of

treaty."

^'*^

On

ICTR

a positive note, finding that the

passed constitutional muster, lent

credence to the international Tribunal's personality. However,

that

principles

pundits have held that the Fifth Circuit's holdings in the Ntakirutimana

both positive and negative precedents.

could justify

"the

its

critics

hold that the court's

was a negative development.^'^'Verily,

the court

decision not to review the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, since

the duty of the committing court. But the fact that the

the witnesses were

members of

the minority and victimized Tutsi tribe, and they were

who

testifying against Ntakirutimana

and lack of credibility following

overwhelming majority of

US

is

from the dominant

tribe reeks of bias, prejudice

^'^^

standards.

This case has far reaching implications for the respect of international obligations

by

all states. It is

clear that the district judge

who

refused to grant the request for the

had a different agenda from international

surrender of Ntakirutimana

unequivocal that the Security Council resolution creating the
states to

the

comply

is

mandatory

ICTR, even though

this is

affront to the United Nations

Government would

to

The United

all.

States

ICTR and

was instrumental

considered a fig-leaf-after-the-fact.

It

and

flout

"^ Factor

calling

It

is

on

all

in establishing

would have been an

and the international community as a whole

turn around

law.

if

the

same

US

UN edicts by not extraditing an ICTR indictee.

v. Laubenheimer,290 U.S. 276,287(1993)
Panayiota Alexandropoulous,Enforceability of Executive-Congressional Agrements In Lieu Of An
Article II Treaty For Purposes of Extradition Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno,45 Vill. L. 107(2000)
:

'"'

Id.

^''^Id.
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This would have sent a clarion message to other rogue nations that they too could refuse

comply with Security Council

to

resolutions with

no

fear of reprisals.

2 - Stratified concurrent jurisdiction and anomalies of inversion: The Barayagw^iza

Case

Background of the judiciary

i -

A

brief flashback

in post genocide

Rwanda

on the Rwandan genocide of 1994

elicits

the

slaughter,

massacre and maiming of nearly a million Rwandans, while close to two million fled the
country. In the aftermath of this catastrophe, the

Rwandan

vast majority of judicial and law enforcement officers

A

was moribund.

judiciary

had been decimated or had fled

the country^'*^ Close to a hundred thousand people were arrested on charges of planning

and executing the

genocide, but the judicial structures were effete or inexistent to handle

such a caseload. In

fact,

the prosecution of

"infeasible in even the wealthiest nation

The
on

situation is rendered

its

and

more complex by

is

more than 90.000 defendants would be
emphatically not an option in Rwanda."

the fact that the

Organic Law,^'^^ and the ICTR, based on

jurisdiction for the prosecution of genocide.

^' See United Nations High Commissioner for
Administration of Justice

in

The

Human

Post Genocide Rwanda,

Rwandan Government, based

Statute

its

'^

and RPE, have concurrent

"interaction of national

and international

Rights Field Operation in Rwanda,

at 2,para. 1

I.U.N. Doc.

The
HRFOR/JUSTICE/June

1996/E(1996)
^'^

(For detailed and comprehensive account of concurrent jurisdiction between the

ICTR and Rwanda) See

Morris, supra note 103, 349-374

National prosecutions for the

Rwandan genocide

are governed

by the "Organization of Prosecutions

for

Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1
1990," Organic Law No. 08/96 (Aug.30, 1996), in Official Journal of the Republic of Rwanda (Sept.l,
1996)(hereinafter Genocide Law). This law relies heavily on a system of plea agreements. All perpetrators
other than those in Category

One (who

will

be subject

to the death penalty-art. 14) will

be entitled to receive
and complete

a reduced sentence as part of a guilty plea bargain (arts. 5, 15,16), in return for an accurate

confession,a plea of guilty to the crimes committed,and an apology to the victims(art.6).5ee also

361

id. at

357-

58

jurisdictions in the

Rwandan

context" raises the possibility of difficulties and "potential

friction... including the distribution of

ii

-

defendants"

among

^"^^

others.

Stratified concurrent jurisdiction

concurrent

"Stratified

depicts

jurisdiction"

International

the

prosecutorial policy regarding the distribution of defendants vis a vis the

judiciary.^'^^

Madeline Morris, a foremost expert on

elucidates the policy

Under

when

Rwandan

concurrent jurisdiction

she says that:

this policy, the international fora

and leaves the lower

stratified

Tribunal's

strata defendants to

seeks to prosecute the leadership stratum

be tried in national courts. This approach

produces anomalous outcomes in the
and followers, creates impediments to national pleaarrangements, and may tend to undermine national judicial

to the distribution of defendants predictably

handling

of

bargaining

leaders

'^^

authority.

In confirming the policy of stratified concurrent jurisdiction, the Prosecutor of the

International Tribunals characterized her strategy as "maintaining an investigative focus

on persons holding higher levels of responsibility, or on those

who have been

personally

responsible for the exceptionally brutal or otherwise extremely serious offences."^'*^

The systematic

application of this policy

by the Tribunals has led

which though undesired, are foreseeable and
that leaders

who

There

are tried in the international Tribunals receive

than the followers

^^

inevitable.

who

are tried in national courts.^^^

349
Madeline Morris, Complementarity and Conflict:
eds., supra note 26,at 203

A

is

to

anomalous

results,

unanimity on the fact

more favorable treatment

major advantage for defendants

Id. at

"^

'''See

States, Victims,

and the ICC,

in

Sewall

& Kaysen,

id.

'^ See Statement by the Prosecutor Following
the Withdrawal of Charges Against 14 Accused, ICTY Doc.
CC/PIU/314-E (May 8,1998)
Sewall & Kaysen eds., supra note, at 203
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of international prosecution

is

the fact that the death penalty is not appHcable.^^' In the

case of Rwanda, the disparity has

Code provides

momentous proportions because

fortuitously

held

Rwandan Penal

During negotiations for the creation of the ICTR,

for the death penalty.

Rwanda, which

the

a

non-permanent seat

the

in

Security

Council

vehemently, objected to the non-inclusion of capital punishment in the Statute. ^^^ The

Rwandan

objection

was premised on

the specter of disparate sentencing and penalties.^^'*

This policy of stratified concurrent jurisdiction "leads to anomalies of inversion in which

who

these crucial advantages flow to the leaders

the

mass crimes, while

then

In

by hypothesis, most responsible

for

As noted by

the

the followers are subject to harsher treatment."^^^

Rwandan Ambassador

reconciliation."

are,

to the

U.N, the "situation

Rwanda, many low

sentenced to death in national courts,^^^

at

profile

is

not conducive to national

defendants have been summarily

times without defense counsel, while leaders

of the genocide have received light sentences after

trials

with

full

due process

at the

ICTR.^^^

^^'

Arts. 24 of ICTY Statute
limited to imprisonment. ."
.

& 23(1) provide that: 'The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be
The Rule 101 of the RPE of ICTY & ICTR provides that: "A convicted person

may be
^^^

convicted for a term up to and including the remainder of his life."
See Republic of Rwanda Decret-Loi No. 21/77,Code Penal Art.26, 1 Codes

et

Lois du

Rwanda

391(1995).
^" Morris, supra note 100,356
""Id.

& Keysen eds., at 204. See also Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgement,5 ILSA J.
& Comp. L. 359,at 365(1999)

Sewall
Int'l.

"^ See U.N. SCOR,49* Sess.,3453''' mtg.,U.N. Doc S/PV. 3453,
(On April 24,1998,twenty two defendants, most of them low level functionaries and peasants without
significant political involvements were executed pursuant to death penalties issued by Rwandan courts for
genocide related crimes) See Sewall & Kaysen eds.,210 n.35(2000)
See e.g.The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, No. 1CTR-96-4-T, 1998 Sentence (Life imprisonment.
Akayesu was a former Mayor of Taba) The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement
and Sentence- 1998 (life imprisonment sentence.Kambanda was the Prime Minister of Rwanda during the
genocide)

60

Some

proponents of

stratified concurrent jurisdiction predicate their

argument on

the international nature of leadership responsibility.^^^They claim that the role of an

international court is to prosecute the leaders because the nature of their crimes is global.

argument does not pass muster even under the international responsibility

However,

this

rationale

because

all

of genocide

"crimes

and crimes against humanity, whether

committed by leaders or by followers are international crimes. As such,

of those

One

writer remarks

community becoming engaged

in a two-track

crimes are defined as being of distinctly international concern."
that there is the risk of the international

all

approach which consists of preferring international venues on the one hand, and a
"benign neglect for domestic approaches" on the other.

Other advantages for defendants standing

trial

before an international Tribunal are

due process protections (including appointed defense counsel) than many national

better

jurisdictions offer; better conditions of incarceration than

national court in question (Rwanda);

would

the prisons of the

and greater assurance of impartiality than national

courts which tend to dispense victor's justice in such cases.

Hi

- The case of Barayagwiza

v.

The Prosecutor.

This case highlights the utmost due process that
appearing before the

ICTR and

the acrimony of the

is

granted to defendants

Rwandan Government

to

what

"' Morris, supra note 100,at 370
'"'Id.
'*'

'*'

Alvarez, supra note 255,at 364
Art.

26 of ICTR Statute. Rule 103(A) of ICTR RPE provides that: Imprisonment shall be served in
or any state designated by the Tribunal from a list of states which have indicated their willingness

Rwanda

to accept convicted persons. Prior to a decision on the place of imprisonment, the Chamber shall notify the
Government of Rwanda.
^^ Kaysen & Sewall eds., supra note 26.,at 203-204
'" Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor,No. ICTR-97-19-AR72,Decision on Prosecutor's Request
for Review or Reconsideration (Mar.3 1,2000)

it
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considered a travesty of justice. The case

Chamber

ICTR on November

of the

3"^^,

is

a review of the decision

by the Appeals

1999 (hereinafter November decision). ^^^The

defendant Jean Bosco Barayagwiza was a founder and senior administrative officer of the

Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), the media organization
contributed a great deal to the propaganda, incitement and execution of the

genocide. ^^^

He was

indicted on

that

Rwandan

numerous counts including genocide, conspiracy,

complicity and direct incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.
the

words of one

writer, taking "everything into account,

the indictment can be even partially established,

most heinously

evil of those responsible for the

In

and assuming the allegations

in

Barayagwiza stands out as one of the

Rwandan genocide- -and

not for want of

competitors."^^^

A

chronology of events

is

pertinent to the understanding of the case

reveal the following^^^: that the defendant fled

Cameroon;

that

Rwanda and sought

refuge in

on March 15,1996, Rwanda, followed by Belgium on a

and they

Cameroon

later date, issued

international arrest warrants and filed requests for extradition of the defendant

Cameroon.

On

April

17,

the

ICTR

^^^

Barayagwiza

On

v.

May

from

Prosecutor requested provisional measures with

respect to the defendant,^^%ut informed
interested in Barayagwiza. On

in

Cameroon

a

month

later that

he was no longer

31,1996, the Yaounde Court of Appeal suspended

Prosecutor.No ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Nov.3,1999)(hereinafter

November

decision)

media in inciting genocide,see Jean-Pierre Chretien,Jean-Francois Dupaquier.Marcel
Kabanda & Joseph Ngarambe,Rwanda: Les Medias du Genocide (1995)
^*^
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza,No. ICTR-97-19, Indictment (Oct. 22, 1997); Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza,No.
ICTR-97-19 (June 28,1999), (leave to amend granted on April 11 ,2000 J*rosecutor v. Barayagwiza,No.
ICTR-97-17-I). The trial Chamber had delayed its decision on the amended indictment until the appeals
chamber decided whether the prosecution of Barayagwiza (which was a central issue in the march decision)
the role of the

could proceed.

For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the Barayagwiza case, see International Decision:
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Bernard H. Oxman, ed.,),94 A.J.I.L. 563,564
^^
For a chronology of events see id.
"° Rule 40 RPE
,
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Rwanda's
decision.

the

Barayagwiza complained of

ICTR

primacy of the ICTR as the basis for

extradition hearing, citing the

his detention in a letter

prosecutor, Louise Arbor responded that he

Rwanda's

extradition request

ICTR

was not being held

at

her behest.

prosecutor this time issued a request for the

provisional detention of the accused pursuant to Rule

ICTR was

addressed to the ICTR, but

was denied by Cameroon and on the day Barayagwiza was

released (February 21,1997), the

to the

their

40

bis.^^'

After an order for deferral

signed by Judge Lennart Aspergen on March 3,^^^and shown to the

accused on March, 10,the President of Cameroon did not order the transfer of the
defendant until October 21. Barayagwiza was finally transferred to the Tribunal's
Detention Center in Arusha, Tanzania on Novemberl9, 1997. Prior to his transfer, the
indictee had filed an application for habeas corpus, but the Trial

never heard the motion. Appearing before the
pleaded not guilty on

all

ICTR on February

Chamber of

ICTR

23,1998, Barayagwiza

counts in the indictment and went on to

urgent motion" seeking to quash his arrest. After the Trial

the

file

an "extremely

Chamber dismissed

the

motion ,^^^Barayagwiza appealed.
In a decision that

in

Rwanda,

the Appeals

had the

effect of a

Chamber ordered

bombshell and was received with incredulity

the dismissal of the indictment and release of

the appellant "with prejudice" to the Prosecutor,^^'* thus effectively blocking any effort to

bring Barayagwiza to justice before the ICTR.^^^

The

"' Rule 40 bis RPE
"^ The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, No. ICTR-97-19-DP,Order

appellate

body of

for the Transfer

the

ICTR, found

and Provisional Detention

(Rule 40 bis)(March 3,1997)

"^ The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza,No. ICTR-97-19-I,Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion By The
Defence To Review and/ Or Nullify the Arrest And Provisional Detention of the Suspect (Nov. 1998)
""Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor.No. ICTR-97-19-AR72,para.l08 (Nov.3,1999)
10(The Appeals Chamber makes reference to Rule 40 bis (H), which provides in part that the
is imperative and is certainly not intended to
permit the prosecutor to file a new indictment and re-arrest the accused.)
Id.,

para.

1

"subject shall be released." In the court's interpretation/'shall"
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was of the opinion

the Prosecutor's conduct "egregious" and

case was tantamount to neghgence,"

this

since

that her "failure to prosecute

she "failed with respect to her

obligation to prosecute the case with due diligence."

The Appeals Chamber
appellant

was

ascertained

in illegal detention.

^^^

three

distinct

periods

The Appeals Chamber premised

during which the

its

decision to stay

proceedings against the appellant on the "abuse of process doctrine." In lauding the
validity

and importance of the supervisory powers

the Appeals

To

Chamber held

that

go with the due process

doctrine,

that:

allow the Appellant to be tried on the charges for which he was belatedly

indicted

would be a

tribunals

court

is at

valuing

travesty of justice. Nothing less than the integrity of the

stake in this case. Loss of public confidence in the Tribunal as a

human

rights

unthinkable crimes would be

of

individuals including those charged with

all

among

the

most serious consequences of allowing

the Appellant to stand trial in the face of such violations of his rights.

as this conclusion

may

be for some to accept,

independent judiciary, to halt

prosecution,

this

it

is

As

difficult

the proper role of an

so that no further injustice

results.^^^

The

court then asked the Registrar to arrange for the suspect's transfer back to

The Rwandan Government's
threatened to suspend

all

reaction

"'

Id. para.

106

Id. para.

101

The

1^'

was immediate and uncompromising. Rwanda

cooperation with the ICTR, and by that token the very existence

of the International Tribunal was in

"**

May 16, when

Without cooperation from Rwanda, the ICTR

peril.

period was fromApril 17,1996,while the

considered, and ended on

Cameroon

Rwandan and Belgian extradition requests were being
Cameroon that he did not intend to try

the prosecutor informed

Barayagwiza.This period of detention exceeded by 9 days the 20 day limit specified in Rule 40(however,
Barayagwiza was being held legally pursuant to the2 extradition requests); The 2°^ period commenced on

March

of the Rwandan extradition request, and concluded 233 days later
ICTR on Nov.l9.The Appeals Chamber held that the appellant was in

4, 1997, following the dismissal

with the appellant's deferral to the

ICTR. According to Rule 40 bis,the prosecutor had a period of 90 days
from the moment Barayagwiza was detained to obtain an indictment,failing which he was entitled to be
released. The 3' period began when the appellant was transferred to the ICTR's detention center, where he
remained for 96 days prior to formally appearing before the ICTR in Feb.1999.The Statute and RPE require
the "constructive custody" of the

the formal appearance to take place "without delay".

November

Decision, supra note 265,para.

1

12
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cannot function. This
obtained from

because almost

is

all

the investigations, evidence,

Rwanda.^^^wanda went on

to file an international

and witnesses are

warrant of arrest for

Barayagwiza with the Registrar of the ICTR. She also requested Tanzania
Barayagwiza, rather than transfer him to Cameroon.

by the ICTR

Barayagwiza

extradite

still

to transfer the accused to

had a duty

genocide.

^^

to

Cameroon because

this

argument

is

the Genocide Convention,

ICTR

Another alternative

to

Tanzanian authorities had manifested

pursuant

Tanzania.'^^'^his put

to

which

offers

two

the

thought

itself as

to release

their willingness

it

should have

bound by

this

the opposite.

Barayagwiza

and cooperation

at

Arusha.The

to bring to justice

Headquarters

enormous pressure on both

Agreement

between

the Prosecutor

the

ICTR and

and the ICTR as a whole.

the former Prosecutor for the International Tribunals Justice Richard Goldstone

Oxman ed.,
Art.

UNTS

ICTR

Rwanda.However, Tanzania was stymied from doing

Rwanda suspension
^*'

should have seen

Cameroon was

those responsible for genocide in

latter

Cameroon would have achieved

forum.^^^ Sending the defendant to

Even

that the

bases viz: an international tribunal or the state where the crime was

been the alternative forum and the

that

decision

promote international criminal responsibility, prevent and prosecute

committed.^^^Since the genocide occurred in Rwanda, the

exactly

at the

the latter had refused to

Rwanda. Rwanda's perception was

in the past to

'The basis of

jurisdictional

Rwanda was angered

to detain

of cooperation with the
supra note 268, at 569

VI of the Convention

ICTR was ephemeral

for the Prevention

and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,Dec.9,1948,78

277(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)

^^^Oxman ed., supra note 268,at 569
^^*
Agreement Between The United Nations and the Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Headquarters of
the International Tribunal of Rwanda, Art.XX, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977(1995)(Pursuant to this Agreement,
Tanzania must abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over any individuals in its territory who have been
transferred as a suspect or accused to the ICTR.This immunity, ceases to have effect only when the person,
having been acquitted or otherwise released by the ICTR and having had for a period of 15 days from the
date of his or her release the opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained in the territory, or having
left

it,

has returned)
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affirms that the ad hoc Tribunals "have been legaHstic to a fault" and they have gone

through the "frustrations and the delays that

come with

the genuine exercise of due

process. Judges take issue with the chief prosecutor; rules of evidence are strictly

maintained; precedent
prosecutors."

is

given

its

due homage. This legalism

^^^

In a motion interpreted as a bid to assuage the

it

saw

is terrifically frustrating to

as an injustice

Rwandan Government's

ire at

and perpetuation of impunity by the ICTR, the Prosecutor

"request for review of decision." Pending the outcome of these proceedings, the

momentarily stayed
the

ICTR

known

to

at the

its

November

3, order for

what

filed a

ICTR

Barayagwiza's release. The Statute allows

review a decision "where a new fact has been discovered which was not
time of the proceedings before the Trial Chambers or before the Appeals

Chamber and which could have been

The

a decisive factor in reaching the decision."

Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires the party requesting the review must show that
the

newly discovered information was not available

discovered by the party with due diligence

at the

to the party

time of the

In considering the request for review, the Appeals

facts."

^^'

Sewall

Taking these new

and could not have been

initial

proceeding.^*^

Chamber noted

facts into consideration, the appellate

several

chamber came

"new
to the

& Kaysen, supra note 26,at 55-56

^^''Art.lS of

ICTR

Statute

Rule 120 of RPE provides: Where

new

been discovered which was not known to the moving
or the Appeals Chamber,and could not have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,the defence or,within one year after the final
judgement has been pronounced ,the Prosecutor.may make a motion to that Chamber for review of the
judgement.
a

fact has

party at the time of the proceedings before a Trial

The

first fact

Chamber

related to a transcript of proceedings before the Court of

April and May), which provided evidence that Barayagwiza

knew

Appeal

in

the nature of the

Cameroon

ICTR

(in

March,

charges against

him. This new fact disposed of one of the findings of the Appeals Chamber in its earlier ruling that
Barayagwiza learned of the charges only in March 1997.The 2"^ new fact concerned information by the
Cameroon and US ambassador at large David Scheffer,which showed that political difficulties in
Cameroon and not prosecutorial negligence, had prevented the deferral of Barayagwiza fi^om Cameroon
Arusha.Thus,his detention,though a violation of his human rights was not his fault.The 3'^'' new fact

to

66

conclusion that they diminished the scale of the prosecutorial abuse, as well as "the
intensity of the violation of the rights of the appellant."^^^

With

this reduction in the

"cumulative effect" of the various breaches, the remedy of dismissing the charges and

was seen

releasing the accused

demand

a remedy, the Appeals

would be

Chamber

ruled that

entitled to financial compensation,

Some

have held

critics

However, since

as "disproportionate."^^*^

that

and

if

found not

if guilty, to

guilty,

all

breaches

Barayagwiza

a mitigation of sentence.

"second decision of the Appeals Chamber

the

"ultimately distorts the law in an effort to achieve the desired result... to compensate for

its

previous decision and in view of

Barayagwiza

to proceed."^^' In the

new

view of

review of a decision soundly arrived

However,
that the

the dual

call

To

in their findings

a cavalier approach to matters of procedure." This case served as

Rwanda's fury from

of suspension of cooperation with the
as an

of the request for

by the ICTR, smacks of double jeopardy.

on the ICTR to be more assiduous and

international justice.

outcome

at

this writer, the granting

judgments of the Appeals Chamber are unanimous

"ICTR has had

a clarion

facts adduced, to enable the prosecution of

less perfunctory in dispensing

the first decision

ICTR

ICTR imprimatur for impunity

real

was predictable and

its

threat

and legitimate, since she viewed the

for Barayagwiza.

an extent, this case also tarnished the confidence of the

ICTR

as

an

independent judicial body whose decisions are based solely on legal principles and not
pressure from countries that threaten non-cooperation. Although they would not concur,

concerned evidence

that in

January 1998, while Barayagwiza was detained in Arusha awaiting his

appearance,his attorney met with

ICTR

authorities

and agreed

to a cut date.thereby

initial

waiving his objection

76 days of the 96 day period.
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor,No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (This decision has no numbered paragraphs). See also
Oxman ed., supra note 268,at 563
to

289

290
J

J

"'Id.

at

567
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this issue

was very much

judgment. This

I

is

in the

minds of the Judges when they passed the second

manifested in the statement proffered by Judge Nieto-Nava:

most strenuously the suggestion

refute

that in reaching decisions, pohtical

considerations should play a persuasive governing role, in order to assuage states

and ensure cooperation

to achieve the long

contrary, in no circumstances

compromise

its

judicial

term goals of the Tribunal.

would such considerations cause

On

the

the Tribunal to

independence and integrity."

The Kingdom of Belgium encountered

similar problems with the

Ntuyahaga Case.^^^ The defendant was indicted
paratroopers and the erstwhile

Rwandan Prime

for the

ICTR

murder of 10 Belgian

in the

UNAMIR

Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.'^^'*

The

case involved an unprecedented motion to withdraw the indictment against Major

Bernard Ntuyahaga,^^^ because Belgium sought to prosecute him for the aforementioned
crimes. In

application,

its

submission, the prosecution gave reasons to support the unprecedented

amongst which was the contention

that the case fell in the category of cases

most appropriate for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by Belgium which had

The prosecution

also

not about competing or antagonistic claims.

It is

instituted criminal investigations against the

proffered that "concurrent jurisdiction

is

accused in 1994.

about universal jurisdiction for the crimes in question."
contention

that

^'^

it

was up

to the

ICTR

to decide

which

Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Mar.31, 2000)
^" The Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, No.-98-40-I(Sept.29,1998)
^^*
See ICTR\ UPD-013. (ICTR Press Releases-March 16,1999)

^'^RPERuleSl
See supra note 294

^"Id.,

was

the prosecution's

"primacy of jurisdiction ought not be construed as monopoly of

jurisdiction" and that

^'^

It

it

could appropriately deal
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with.^^^The Prosecution rested
release of the accused

from

the

ICTR

case by asking the

its

ICTR's custody

to the

Trial

Chamber

to order the

Tanzanian authorities.

Appearing as amicus curiae, Belgium supported the prosecution's motion on the
following basis: that

if

withdrawal

is

the accused to Belgium; or if this

handed

to

Tanzanian

granted, the

was not

ICTR

feasible

should order the direct transfer of

on any legal grounds, he should be

ICTR

authorities. In the latter scenario, the

should obtain guarantees

of his extradition to Belgium.^^^ Belgium, which had issued an international warrant of

accused since 1995, transmitted a request for extradition to Tanzania

arrest against the

immediately the accused was transferred

to the

ICTR's Detention

Facility in Arusha,

Tanzania. She argued that concurrent jurisdiction as provided in the Statute "is the rule

and primacy of the tribunal over national courts

The defense on

its part,

handover an accused person

withdraw charges as
to "act as a rubber

In

its

the exception."

argued that the Statutes do not empower the

to

a national jurisdiction

in the present case.

The defense

stamp for some national

if

attorney

jurisdictions.

It is

the Prosecution

admonished

The Chamber

against arrest

Agreement.

the

ICTR

seeks to

ICTR

Chamber ordered

also invoked a fifteen-day

In

its

rendition, the

ICTR amongst
that

other issues,

no person

shall

made

reference to the non

be tried by a national court for

Id.,
v.

the

of the accused by the Host Country, pursuant to the Headquarters

idem principle which provides

^"^rosecutor

not

immunity

'''Id.,

^<"

to

a United Nations body."^^^

decision on the motion to withdraw the indictment, the Trial

immediate release of Ntuyahaga.

bis in

is

Ntuyahaga, No.ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on Motion To Withdraw Indictment (March

18,1999)

See Headquarters Agreement, supra note 284
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acts

which he has already been

Article 9 para.2, a person

tried

by the ICTR.

to the

who

tried

Tribunal.^^'^

between

states

ICTR was

concerned, which in no

may be

of the opinion that this was a

This infuriated the then Belgian Minister of Justice,

and not reciprocal.

between the

ICTR and

subsequently

by Belgium and Rwanda

way involved

other U.N.

the

Van

War Crimes
Parys,

member

who

states

^^^

ICTR\INFO-9-2-174,"InipIementation of Trial Chamber's Decision
Registry Says,"(Mar.31, 1999)
Le Matin,"Premiere elections depuis le genocide," (Mar.31, 1999)

ICTR

circumstances provided in

In response to the extradition requests lodged

criticized the fact that cooperation

unilateral

if in

has been tried before a national court

Tanzania authorities, the Registry of the

bilateral issue

"'

by the ICTR, even

in

Ntuyahaga Case

Was Correct,

was

CHAPTER 5

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)
A The Rome Statute creating an ICC
-

The

and the subsequent

thrust for an International Criminal Court

which adopted the Statute

for the

Rome

ICC, culminates more than seventy-five years of

Treaty,

and struggle by the international community

to bring

efforts

about a permanent international

criminal judicial body.^^ July 17,1998,constitutes a milestone in the crusade towards the
eradication of impunity for crimes which are of utmost concern to the international

community.

On

120

that day,

permanent ICC (hereinafter the
initially refusing to sign the

Since
to deal

its

states voted to

Rome

Rome

United States and six other

states

^^^

inception, the idea of an international criminal justice system fashioned

with the most egregious crimes against humanity has bedeviled the United

desirability

UN,

the General

Assembly resolved

to "study the

and the possibility of establishing an international judicial organ... ""^^^ Efforts

to create an

ICC

in the past

were thwarted by

sovereignty being the chief culprit.

war gave way

^"^

Statute), with the

Statute.

Nations. In the earlier days of the

^^

approve the text of a treaty to create a

political considerations of states, with

The enthusiasm manifested by

to the harsh realities of the

the Allies after the

Cold War. The logical sequence

in the absence

Rome

Statute, supra note 4
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (139

28,2000)
^°*
G.A. Res.260, U.N.

GAO,3d

states

Sess.,

have signed and 37 states have

U.N. Doc.A/8I0(1948)

^^ Miller, supra not 170,at 553

70

ratified the

ICC

Statute as of June

71

of an

ICC was

the laissez faire that greeted the prohferation,

crimes against mankind. Cherif Bassiouni

of the opinion that:

is

Impunity must no longer be the reward of those

and violations of human

international crimes

and commission of heinous

who commit

the

most egregious

rights. In addition to the

many never

prosecuted by the ad hoc tribunals established following certain international

many more

conflicts,

criminals in internal conflicts have not been brought to

^''^

justice.

Serious negotiations for an

created a Preparatory

(hereinafter

and 1998

ICC began

in

1995 when the General Assembly

Committee on the Establishment of an

PrepCom).

to resolve a

^''

A

series of six

number of

International Criminal Court

PrepCom meetings were

technical questions.

held between 1996

However, many issues remained

unresolved and the General Assembly decided to hold a Diplomatic Conference in
in

June and July of 1998.^'^ The target was to reach agreement on the

"that

would

However,

it

is

worthwhile to note that the

have

ratified the

The establishment of
system.

rights

a permanent

The absence of a

known

as the

Bassiouni, supra note 35
^" U.N.G.A. Res. 50/46,U.N. Doc.

^"'

Art.

come

ICC

into existence only

forges the "missing link" in the international

judicial

body

meant

to

deal

that the

with

individual

criminal

most egregious violations of

World Court, has locus standi

A/RE S/5 0/46, Dec. 1 1 1995

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26 at 61

126 of the

will actually

and humanitarian law benefited from impunity. The International Court of

Justice, otherwise

Sewall

ICC

Rome Treaty.^^'*

responsibility in the international arena

human

of a treaty

create the last great international organization of the twentieth century."

after sixty states

legal

final text

Rome

Rome Treaty

,

to handle only cases

72

between

States, not individuals.

The ICC would provide

a

forum and thus acknowledge

the crimes that perpetrators commit.'''^

1-

The need

for

an

effective

ICC

There are ample reasons for the establishment of an effective ICC amongst which are the
following^'^:

(i)-

Deterrence

The

human

culture of impunity "not only encourages the recurrence of abuses against

dignity, but also strips

effect."^ '^

One advocate

for a

human

right

permanent ICC

The quantum of human harm produced

is

and humanitarian law of

their deterrent

of the opinion that:

since

World War

II

by

conflicts of a non-

and victimization by tyrannical
War I and World
War II... While an international justice system might not stop future conflicts, it
would vindicate the victims of international crimes and remind ourselves and
^'^
future generations of the victims' plight and the perpetrator's misdeeds.
international character -purely internal conflicts

regimes far exceeds the combined casualty figures of World

It

is

obvious that the lack of prosecution emboldens perpetrators. The failure of the

international

community

to

Armenians serves as a lesson
before the

German

prosecute Turkey

in morality. In

for

genocide committed against

response to a question posed by his generals

invasion of Poland in 1939,Hitler responded,
3

speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?"
the opinion that "it

the

would have encouraged

1

"Who

after all is

today

Q

His alter ego, Albert Speer, was of

a sense of responsibility

on the

part of leading

Richard Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address,? Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. l,at 7(1997)
For a comprehensive account of this subject, see Young Sok Kim, The Cooperation of a State to
EstabHsh an Effective Permanent International Criminal Court,6 D.C.L.J. Int'l & Prac.157 (1997)

The Lawyers Committee
'

for

Human

Rights, Establishing an International Criminal Court,at 3

Bassiouni, supra note 35, 62

James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the
World War, at 173(1982)(quoting Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders and Commanding
Generals on the Obersalzburg, Aug. 22, 1939, in 7 British Documents on Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,Third
Series, 258(E.L Woodward et al eds., 1949-55))
First
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political figures if after the First

World War

had actually held the

the Allies

trials

they

had threatened."^^"

(ii)-To

counter the failure of national judicial systems:
Violations of

human

rights

and humanitarian law are ideally dealt with by

national authorities of the state where the crimes or violations were committed.

states are

very reticent to prosecute their citizens, especially

are in positions of authority.

systems,

(iii)-

if

permanent ICC could salvage

permanent ICC

will indeed

remedy

who

lacuna in national

only

within

certain

the criticism levied against the ad hoc

and time. The scope of

geographical

and

areas,^^^

committed within a certain period of time. The
tribunals

this

the shortcomings of ad hoc international tribunals:

tribunals that they are limited in both space

exercised

the accused persons

they are unable or unwilling to prosecute.

To remedy

A

A

when

However,

they

their jurisdiction is

cover only crimes

a-la-carte or selective creation of ad

by the Security Council has also come under attack by some

claim that the decision to create the

ICTY was

hoc

states like Serbia

politically motivated.

Former

Prosecutor for the ad hoc tribunals. Judge Richard Goldstone lends credence to this
criticism

when he

internationally.

A

says that the "essence of justice

decent and rational person

is

is its

universality, both nationally

and

offended that criminal laws should apply

only to some people and not to others in similar situations." ^^^Judge Goldstone goes

^^^
^^'

^^^

Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries 43(Richard & Clara Winston trans., MacMillan Publ'g 1976)
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, supra note 317,at 3
Former Yugoslavia in the case of the ICTY; and Rwanda in the case of the ICTR

"^ Goldstone, supra note

1

17,at

122
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forth to articulate

by

how

he

felt "distinctly

why

the Serb Justice minister as to

fomier Yugoslavia when

it

uncomfortable" when confronted with a question

the United Nations

had not done so for Cambodia,

or Liberia. This raises questions of double standards.

applied to similar situations?

this

now

had a

War Crimes

Iraq,^^'*

Why

is

Tribunal for

as well as Sien-a

Leone

different treatment being

Was

the former Yugoslavia being treated differently or

It is

also widely

an act of discrimination.

experiencing "tribunal fatigue," and

is

acknowledged

was

that the Security Council is

probably reluctant to set up another ad hoc

tribunal.^^^

Indeed,

are

there

practical

international criminal justice,

reasons

amongst which

for

is

advocating

a

permanent system of

the premise that such a system

would

eliminate the necessity of establishing ad hoc tribunals every time the need arises:

The

decision to establish such tribunals, not to mention drafting the applicable statutes,

takes considerable time during which the evidence of the crime dissipates. Moreover, a
political

debate

is

invariably reopened over the provisions of the statute,

conduct the prosecutions, and

who

will sit in

who

will

judgement. Such pressures leave ad hoc

tribunals vulnerable to political manipulation.^^^

B - Complementarity
Unlike the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, which resolve the conflict of
concurrent jurisdiction with states by bestowing the tribunals with primacy, the

Treaty that gave
(hereinafter

its

imprimatur for the creation of an International Criminal Court

ICC) has a

totally different jurisdictional

"complementarity."

The Lawyer's Committee
'^^

Rome

for

Human

Bassiouni, supra note 35,at 60

Rights, supra note 317,at 3

regime commonly referred to as

75

The ICC's

central concept of

between national and international

complementarity reflects a growing interrelationship

courts. ^^^The

ICC

will

have jurisdiction only when

its

Judges ascertain that national judicial authorities are "unable or unwilling." In the words
of one informed commentator:
This concept provides a framework for a

new

and perhaps even for a
partnership between national and supranational judges. Although the most
obvious implication of this arrangement is that supranational judges must evaluate
the quality and the sincerity of their national counterparts, the relationship need
not be and is unlikely to be primarily confrontational. Instead of the supranational
tribunal seeking to encroach on national jurisdiction by carving out specific issues
or doctrinal areas for its own, this arrangement instead assumes that national
courts have primary jurisdiction and indeed presumes that national courts will be
fully up to the task of doing justice. It is only in exceptional circumstances where
this assumption does not hold that jurisdiction will devolve to the supranational
relationship

level'''

The precept of complementarity concerns

the allocation of jurisdiction between

domestic courts and the ICC. Since "complementarity questions can arise only in cases

where both the Court and
the

a State

have not only the capacity, but the intent to prosecute

same crime, complementarity presupposes

that there is a subset of 'interested states'

with an interest in prosecuting these cases."^^^ The

on the view

that the exercise of police

first

PrepCom based complementarity

power and penal law

is

a prerogative of States, and

therefore national courts should have primacy.^^''

The most developed
tribunals, analogous to

judicial partnership

complementarity

is

between national and supranational

the one between the

European Court of Justice

™ Abram Chayes & Ann-Marie Slaughter, The ICC and the Future of the Global Legal System, in Sewall
& Kaysen eds.,at 242
Jeffrey L.BIeich, Report of the International

Law

Association: Complementarity,20 Denv.

J. Int'l

L.

Pol'y 281(1997)

'Taking into account

that

under international law, exercise of police power and penal law

is

a

prerogative of States, the jurisdiction of the Court should be viewed only as an exception to such State
prerogative."

1

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Sess., Supp. No. 22,117,U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)

Court,U.N.GAOR,5l"

&
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'I'l'i

and the national courts of European Union member
"principle of subsidiarity," and

which do not

fall

within

its

it

signifies that the

This

states.

Community may

exclusive competence "only

if

and

the

by reason of

Community."

Member

states

and can

the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved

Rome

Statute, the International

Law Committee

had come up with a Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court
to address

take action in areas

by

^^^

Prior to the

had

as the

in so far as the objectives

of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
therefore,

known

is

some

issues,

which are pertinent

to the

(hereinafter ILC)^^^

in 1994.^^'*

The LLC

smooth functioning of jurisdiction

between States and the ICC.These issues included the determination of which competent

forum has

priority;

challenging

ICC

is

who

define

what standard

an

'interested

shall

the

purposes of

has the burden of proof in determining whether a domestic

at

what stage

in the

Abram Chayes

reflects a general

may

consensus that the ICC

only complement these

Thus, contrary to the ad hoc tribunals that have primacy over national

& Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Future of the Global Legal

System, in Sewall

& Kaysen

supra note 26,at 243

The Treaty on European Union introduced the principle of subsidiarity into the EC Treaty,Art.3b. See
Werner Weidenfeld & Wolfgang Wessels, Europe from A to Z.Guide to European Integration, 247248
^
The ILC is responsible for the development and codification of international law (ILC was established
by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 174(11) of Nov. 1947)
^
See Report of the International Law Committee on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR,
49th See., Supp. No.lO.U.N.Doc. A/49/10(1994)(hereinafter ILC Draft)
"^ Bleich, supra note 329,at 282
also

"*

"Md.

is

proceedings. ^^^^Some of these issues shall be discussed

However,"the Statute as drafted thus

authorities."

eds.,

for

apply for determining the competency

should not supplant national judicial authorities, but

^^'

state'

competent; what institution will ultimately resolve whether a domestic forum

competent and
later on.

factors

jurisdiction;

of a domestic forum;

forum

what
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courts, the trier of fact

can adequately say that with complementarity, the ICC defers

to

viable and competent national courts.

1

- Complementarity: The deference of the ICC
The Rome Conference,

by

the international

ICC

community

would put an end

that

will

to

go down

to national courts

in the annals of history as a gigantic stride

to bring about a

permanent, independent and effective

impunity by prosecuting, detering and punishing those

accused of the worst crimes against humanity. However, the Statute's provisions on

complementarity have
desuetude
effectively.

at

its

this Court.

inception, or whether such an

ICC would be stymied from

would be taking precedence over

"^^^

This signifies that

if

a state could

interest

by the ICC

in the venture.

Some

acting

that

it

was already engaged

efforts

prophets of

will

of

all

doom have

predicted

possible worlds, one day in the future, the International Court

have no cases whatsoever. Under the pressure of

judicial systems will

be dealing

in

good

faith

with their

its

oversight,

own war

all

national

criminals, at the

That would obviously be a better system, and getting to such a point is
one of the goals of the entire exercise. In the meantime, democracies like the
United States, with highly developed systems of military as well as civilian
local level.

justice,

would invariably be able

complementarity.

"«Id..

"'Id..

own

nationals

by invoking

^^^

Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases
& Kaysen eds., supra note 26,at 96

Sewall

to shield their

in

Rome: The United

in

would automatically

that:

in the best

in

and specifically

international ones,

show

fall

the "notion that national

is

bona fide investigations and prosecutions, then those national
trump any

ICC would

pundits reflecting as to whether the

Central to the principle of complementarity

judicial systems

over

left

States and the Struggle for an ICC, in

78

Amongst

the

most

sensitive issues in the negotiation of the

relationship between the States and the ICC.

ICC

is

With

Rome

Statute

was the

the principle of complementarity,"the

to function as a jurisdictional 'safety net' only

when

there

is

no

forum

alternative

to prosecute those linked to serious international crimes."^'**^The jurisdiction of the

ICC

is

expressly limited to cases where a State with jurisdiction has failed to genuinely
investigate or prosecute the case.^'*' This signifies that a state with jurisdiction has

primacy and "can

assert a superior right to deal with a case

prosecuting

In such a case the

state

it."^"^^

ICC must

determines that no prosecution

"positions the

when they

ICC

is

simply by investigating

defer to national proceedings even

warranted.^"*^ In the opinion of

one

...or

if

the

writer, this

essentially as a substitute for national courts, to fulfill their functions

are unavailable,

and would seem

to

imply

that, at least in

priority of place is given to national-level justice interests.

States are very jealous of their sovereignty,

international or supranational

international tribunals,

where

body without a

some

respects,

"^'^^

and would not cede any part of

fight.

it

to an

This has been the case of ad hoc

states use the sovereignty

paradigm to snub the primacy

and orders of the international judicial bodies. Worthy of note here

is

the fact that the ad

hoc tribunals were created by the Security Council acting under

its

Charter conferred

Chapter VII powers and not via a multilateral treaty as would have been appropriate. This

means

that states that

comply with

'**'

^"^

^*^

Sewall

were against the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals were compelled

UNSC resolutions, because these

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26, 73-74

Art 17(1), 5«pranote,5

Sewall

& Kaysen eds.,

Sewall

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26,

supra note 26, 74

197

are mandatory.

to
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The

principle of complementarity or the deference

proceedings

is

"embodied

by the ICC

in an elaborate set of procedural

to national criminal

ICC

requirements limiting the

Prosecutor's authority to proceed with a case."^'*^ Pursuant to Article 18,

easy for a

it is

State that has investigated or is investigating a case to challenge at every time

investigation

notify

by the ICC of the same

all states

The Prosecutor of

case.

the

ICC

with jurisdiction about any investigations commenced,

expected to

is

^'^^

any

except those

based on a referral by the Security Council. Within a month of receipt of notification.
States

must inform the Prosecutor about

their

own

investigations of the defendant."''*^

At

the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of those

persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to
•540

authorize the investigation."

The same

is

true of a state,

which

is

not a party to the

Rome Treaty. ^'^^
Under
investigation

Article

only

if

17, a

Pre-Trial

Chamber can decide

two out of three Judges ascertain

to

that

authorize

the

State

is

an

ICC

grossly

incompetent to carry out a proper investigation. ^^^ Pursuant to such a determination by
the Pre-Trial

Chamber, the State concerned may appeal the decision on an expedited

basis to the Appeals Chamber,^^' where a majority of five judges will decide the matter.

With the

Rome

deliberate one. In the

Statute, the choice of

complementarity was a conscious and

view of one observer, the "decision by the international community

of sovereign independent states to negotiate a Statute for a

Sewall
^"^

Rome

& Kaysen, supra note 26, at 74

Statute, Art. 18(1)

'"'id. Art. 18(2)

Sewall

& Kaysen eds.„supra note 26, 74

"»Id.
'^'

Rome

Statute, Art. 18(4)

new permanent

International

80

Criminal court, while undertaken with an acute sense of the historical significance of
such an institution, was never intended to override state sovereignty entirely."^^^ The

most important question

by

national courts and

case

in

Rome was where

who would make

to

draw the

line

on the guarantee of primacy

which side of the

the decision on

line a particular

fell.^^^

2 - Complementarity as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the

The common man on
simplistic perception that

when

the street or the

the

ICC comes

uninformed onlooker might have the

into being,

it

would be

crimes against humanity committed around the world. However,
especially

with

the

concept of complementarity.

provisions "exist within the

basis for the

ICC

this statement

ICC Treaty

becomes compelling when

1

In

the

it

a panacea for

all

will not actually be so,

opinion of one observer,

could be interpreted as providing a statutory

taking a very low-volume prosecutorial approach. "^^"*The validity of

exegesis of Articles 1,5 and 17 of the

Article

that

ICC

provides that the

Rome

ICC

the trier of fact simultaneously

Statute.

"shall

makes an

^^^

have the power to exercise

its

jurisdiction

over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern... and shall be

complementary

when

it

to national criminal jurisdictions." Article 5 articulates a similar

states that the subject matter "jurisdiction of the

serious crimes of concern to the international

"^ See Doherty

message

Court shall be limited to the most

community

as a whole."^^^ Article 17

& McCormack.supra note 6,152

'"Id.
'^"^

Sewall

& Kaysen eds.„supra note 26,199

Rome Statute, Art.5 (1), provides for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC viz:
genocide (b) Crimes against humanity(c) War Crimes (d) The crime of aggression

(a)

The crime of

81

includes as a basis for inadmissibility of a case before the

ICC

that the crime,

even while

within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, "is not of sufficient gravity to warrant

further action

by the

Court."''^^

The

inclusion of "insufficient gravity" as a basis for

inadmissibility of cases otherwise within the ICC's jurisdiction compels the conclusion

some

that

shall

instances of genocide, crimes against humanity,

be held 'not sufficiently grave' to warrant the ICC's action. Reading Articles

and 17 together, Virginia Morris thinks
be damaging

to the

be that the ICC

With
the

war crimes, and aggression

ICC

this gravity

requirement would

very small number of the most culpable perpetrators.

the objective of preserving the jurisdiction of states

to intrude

on

that jurisdiction, the

5

"minimalist approach" to the Treaty would

this

ICC, and a plausible "interpretation of

try a

1,

Rome

and

"^^^

to limit the right of

Statute elicits in "clear

and narrow"

terms the standard of what constitutes the "unwillingness" or "inability" of a state to
carry out a genuine prosecution. ^^^

The ICC may determine "unwillingness"

proceedings before the national court "was

made

if

the

for the purpose of shielding the person

concerned from criminal responsibility;"^^° when there has been an unjustified delay

in

the proceedings inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;^^^ or

where the proceedings were or are being conducted

in a

manner

inconsistent with an

intent to bring accused to justice.

In determining

prosecution, the

ICC

Under Art.5

ICC

(2), the

what constitutes

shall consider whether,

(

Sewall

& Kaysen eds.„supra note 26,199

"'Id. at 74
^^ Rome Statute, Art. 17(2)(a)
^'^'
Seeid. Art.l7(2)(b)

^"Seeid.

Art. 17(2)(c)

of a State to carry out genuine

"due to a

shall exercise jurisdiction over the

and conditions are set out under which the Court
^" Rome Statute, Art. 1 7 1 )(d)
^^^

"inability"

total

or substantial collapse or

crime of aggression once the crime

shall exercise jurisdiction

is

defined

C - Is complementarity a vestigial form of primacy?
1

-

Complementarity and challenges

The

to admissibility of

principle of complementarity

is

a case before the ICC.

intended to avoid

some of

the problems that

were linked with the concept of primacy, which governs concurrent jurisdiction of the ad
hoc international Tribunals and national courts.^^^ As seen earlier on in

ICTY and ICTY

in their "renditions of concurrent jurisdiction,

the conflicts to be confronted

when an

international court tries

courts concurrently try others arising from the

this paper, the

have previewed some of

some

cases while national

By

same context of mass crimes."

the

provisions of their Statutes, the ad hoc international Tribunals can trump national court

proceedings

by

virtue

of

wielding jurisdictional

primacy.

In

some

cases,

"this

arrangement has engendered acrimony" between the Tribunals and States wishing to
prosecute accused persons over

whom

the Tribunal have taken jurisdiction.

This part of the paper seeks to answer the question whether complementarity
incorporates a vestigial form of primacy jurisdiction, as

Tribunals.

A

case

is

inadmissible before the

handled by a national jurisdiction.^^^
para.2,

^^^

^^ Sewall

ICC

if it

If admissibility is

is

the case with the ad hoc

has been or shall be competently

challenged pursuant to Article 19

the International Criminal Court shall be the final arbiter

on

admissibility.^^'

& Kaysen eds.„supra note 26, 202

Morris, supra note 103 (The problem of active concurrent jurisdiction in the sphere of the ad hoc

Tribunals have arisen primarily in the

Rwandan Gov't
Yugoslav
'^*

Rwandan

context rather than the former Yugoslav context.

The

has actively attempted to conduct extensive national prosecutions than have the former

states).

See also

id.

A defining example of this acrimony

is

the

Barayagwiza Case, supra note 264

(as well as stratified

concurrent jurisdiction and anomalies of inversion)
^*'
See supra note 5,Art.l7
"" Under Art. 19 (2), challenges to the jurisdiction of the ICC may be made by the following:
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued under
article 58
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case

or has investigated or prosecuted; or
(c)

A State from

which acceptance of jurisdiction

is

required under article 12.

83

I

84

Once

the

ICC makes such

a determination,

its

jurisdiction over the admissible case

be exclusive, thus precluding a national court's handling of the case,
the

Rome

Statute's ne bis in

Even though

idem

in

would

conformity with

rule.

the Statute evinces a constant tension

between supranationalism and

deference to state sovereignty, a momentous victory for proponents and advocates of a
strong, effective

and independent ICC

is

the fact that,

the Court, not State Parties,

"it is

whether cases are admissible, whether the Court has jurisdiction, whether

that will decide

a State's investigation or prosecution

whether evidence

is

is

genuine in determining complementarity, and

admissible or not."^^^This

is

a defining

example of the assertion

that

the "ICC's complementarity thus incorporates a revised form of primacy in the sense that

the

ICC can

assert exclusive jurisdiction

even over the objection of a

a fine distinction with the ad hoc Tribunals

primacy
to

when

to prosecute

that

the ICC,

it

the fact that the latter wield their

However,

power of

and exclude national prosecution without any statutory guidance as

power should be
is

is

state."'^^'*

applied."'^^

That

said,

whether

the ad hoc tribunals or

it is

the international tribunals that ultimately determine

whether they

will

exercise jurisdiction over a particular case, to the exclusion of national courts.

"'

Rome

Statute, Art. 19(1) provides that:

The Court

any case brought before it. The Court may on
accordance with article 17.
Art. 20 (2) provides:

No

its

own

shall satisfy itself that

it

self that

it

has jurisdiction in

motion, determine the admissibility of a case in

person shall be tried before another court for a crime

has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court. (This

is

similar to the

non

...

which that person
idem provisions in the

for

bis in

Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals.)

& Kaysen
656-657

"^Sewall
Statute,
374
""

Id. at

375

Id.,

202

eds.,, supra

note 26,at 40. See also Sadat Wexler,

A First Look at the

1998

Rome

85

With regard

to

preliminary rulings regarding admissibility, the Prosecutor's

deferral to a state investigation,

is

open

to

review

if

there

significant

is

change

circumstances affecting that state's unwillingness or inability to prosecute.^^^ Even

an

ICC

investigation has been deferred to a state, the Prosecutor

Chamber

is

that inspite of

may

ask the Pre-Trial
this is

"for the purpose of preserving evidence

where

a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there

that such evidence

is

a significant risk

not be subsequently available. "^^^ This goes a long

ICC deference

when

Eventhough

to authorize procedures for the preservation of evidence.

envisaged only on an exceptional basis
there

may

in

to national courts,

way

to

show

complementarity does not constitute a

carte blanche for national judicial systems.

2 - Complementarity and Security Council referrals to the ICC:
In response to the question regarding the trigger

can bring cases before the ICC, the
viz: referrals

by

Rome

a State Party; referrals

mechanism of

makes provisions

Statute

ICC, or who

the

for three avenues,

by the Security Council acting under

its

Chapter

VII powers; and the propria motu or self initiating investigation by the Prosecutor.

However, there

are preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction,

and they are required

"**Art.l8(2)

"^
"^

Art. 18 (3)

Art. 18 (6)

Rome

Statute, Art. 14 provides:

The Court may

exercise

its

to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute
(a)

A situation

in

jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred
if:

which one or more of such crimes appear

to

have been committed

is

referred to the

Prosecutor by a State in accordance with article 14
(b)

A situation

in

which one or more of such crimes appears

to

have been committed

is

referred to the

Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
or
(c)

The Prosecutor has
15

initiated

an investigation

in respect

of such a crime in accordance with

article

86

when

a State Party or the propria

ICC can only

such cases, the

motu Prosecutor brings a case before

exercise

its

jurisdiction if the State

the ICC.'^^^

on whose

In

territory the

crime was committed (territoriahty principle) or the State of nationality of the defendant
(nationality principle) is a State Party to the Statute.^^' This is a reflection or a

of the principle of complementarity that

On

the flip side, the

Rome

is visible

throughout the

Rome

Statute.

Statute provides for "automatic jurisdiction" or

inherent jurisdiction. Thus, a State Party consents to the jurisdiction of the

automatically

when

it

ratifies the

Rome

requirement of state consent to be
exercise of

inception.

ICC

One

continuum

Statute.

two

at

^^^

Some

ICC

States like the U.S.

different stages, that

is, at

wanted the

the acceptance and

Such a requirement would have imperiled the ICC

jurisdiction.

observer opines

at its

that:

for the Court to be as effective as possible, state consent should be called for

once and for

all,

when

a State

becomes a party

deprive the Court of the predictability of
right of veto to determine

to the Statute. Otherwise,

it

would

function by granting States de facto

its

whether the Court

is

able to exercise jurisdiction. Thus,

State consent to the acceptance and exercise of jurisdiction should be integrated
into a single

act.^^'*

same

when

the United Nations Security Council, acting under

its

Charter conferred Chapter VII powers refers a case to the ICC, no precondition

is

In the

light,

required. In such a case, the

ICC can

exercise jurisdiction even

nationality of the accused or the state

State Party to the

^^'

382

Rome

Rome

Treaty."'^^

on whose

This

is

territory the

when

neither the state of

crime was committed

usually the classic case

when

is

the Security

Statute, art. 12 para.2

Young Sok Kim, The

a

Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court:

With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute, 8 J. Int'l L. & Prac. 47(1999)
^*'
Id.at 64
^^ Proposal submitted by the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.183/C.1/L.6 (June
19,1998)
^**
Sok Kim, supra note,382, 55
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Council has determined that there

instances, the edicts of Council are

Rome

whether they are party to the

and

a threat to international peace

is

mandatory on
Statute.

security. In such

U.N. members, irrespective of

all

Thus, a referral by the Security Council

where the principle of complementarity

constitutes

one of the rare and

inexistent,

and the ICC takes precedence over national criminal judicial systems. The

situation is the

same

direct instances

as that of the

primacy of the ad hoc

tribunals,

deference by national courts to the international bodies. This
there are

still

The

some

vestiges of primacy of the

issue of whether the

ICC

in the

is

Rome

ICC Prosecutor should

where there

is

is

a clear

a testament to the fact that

Statute.

self initiate an investigation

without the referral or benediction of a State Party or the Security Council was topical

too.

The United

was

States

particularly

concerned about a potent and independent

own domestic

when Independent

Prosecutor,

reminiscent

Prosecutor,

Kenneth Starr investigated President Clinton on the Monica Lewinsky

scandal.

was of

^^^ Ambassador

of

David

its

political

fiasco

J.Scheffer, the U.S. Representative to the

ICC Conference,

the opinion that the Treaty "creates a proprio motu, or self initiating prosecutor,

who on

his

or her

own

authority,

with the consent of two judges, can initiate

investigations and prosecutions without referral to the Court of a situation either

government

that is party to the Treaty or

by a

by the Security Council."^^^

However, U.S. apprehensions and contentions

are tenuous because there are

safeguards against unbridled prosecutorial discretion in the

Rome

Statute.

Ambassador

^**Sok Kim, supra note 382,54 (1999)
Lori Sinanyan, The International Criminal Court: Why the United States Should Sign the Statute (But
Perhaps Wait to Ratify), 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 171,1 198 (2000)
See Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing Before the

Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong.,
14

at

88

Scheffer himself confirms this

when he

other countries and start investigating ....He has to

he has
So,

to

it is

work with other governments

fulfill

documentary requirements, and

in order to achieve his investigative objectives.

not a completely independent prosecutor with access throughout the world."

Rome

However, the
free

walk into

says, that the "prosecutor cannot simply

from the

conferees recognized that for there to be an effective ICC,

political obligations

and considerations of States, as

is

the case of the

Security Council, there had to be an independent Prosecutor to start an investigation. In

the

opinion

one

of

effectiveness of the

ICC because

another state

against

an

observer,

and/or

independent

own human

rights practices.

The Rome Treaty

for an

fundamental

to

the

because of the political and diplomatic

nationals

its

3-ICC jurisdiction on non-State

is

"States have proved unwilling to initiate proceedings

ramifications involved. Their reluctance

of their

prosecutor

is

also based a fear inviting retaliatory scrutiny

"^^°

Parties:

ICC

Or

reason for U.S. reticence to the

ICC?

provides for the creation of an international court

with subject matter jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression

(when

the latter

the state on

is

As

defined).

whose

territory the

a precondition to the exercise of

crime was committed or the

perpetrator must be a party to the Treaty, or grant

of the Court,

^«' Id, at

Rome

state that

becomes party

state of nationality

either

of the

voluntary consent to the jurisdiction

to the Statute, automatically accepts the

27

Jelena Pejic,

^''Rome

A

its

ICC jurisdiction,

The Need

for an Independent Prosecutor, in Lori Sinanyan, supra note 387,

1200

Statute, art.5

Statute, art. 12 (2); ...the

Court

may

exercise

its

jurisdiction if one or

more of the following

States

are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3
(a)

The

State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

.
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ICC

jurisdiction of the

with respect to the above crimes. ^^^ The

jurisdiction over states that are not parties to the treaty

to jurisdiction.

its

^^"^

Vn

ICC

will

and have not otherwise consented

powers and jurisdiction based on the consent of the

of nationahty of the accused, one writer observes

the

exercise

Thus, in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council acting under

Charter conferred Chapter

state

ICC may

that:

have jurisdiction to prosecute the nationals of any

state

when crimes

within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a
state that is a party to the

That

territorial basis

Treaty or that consents to

would empower

ICC jurisdiction

for that case.

the Court to exercise jurisdiction

cases where the defendant's state of nationality

is

even

in

not a party to the Treaty and

one

does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.

The United
would make
the

ICC

States vigorously contended and pressed for an

amendment
qua non

for

no action and

the

the consent of state of nationality of the accused a condition sine

to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.

^^^

Norway

called for a

that

majority states, propelled by the Like-Minded Group,^^^ overwhelmingly rejected this

proposal for amendment.

The

(b)

^^ Art. 12

(1):

398

State of which the person accused of the crime

is

a national

A State which becomes Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with

respect to the crimes referred to in article 5
^^*

Rome

Statute, art. 12 (3): If the acceptance

of a State which

is

not a Party to this Statute

is

required under

paragraph 2,that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court with respect to he crime in question. The accepting state shall cooperate with the Court without

any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.
^^'
Madelin Morris, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Nationals of Non-Party
States,6 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L.363 (2000). See generally Young Sok Kim, The Preconditions to the
Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the
Statute,8

J. Int'l

L.

& Prac.47(2000). For a detailed account of U.S.

Rome

arguments, see also Lori Sinanyan, The

Why the United States should sign the Statute (But Perhaps wait to Ratify),73
Rev. 1171(2000)
^^ Proposal submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (July
14,1998);
see Annex 4
International Criminal Court:

S. Cal. L.

The Like-Minded Group was

ICC broader powers and

nations, including the United

Singapore, South Korea

The

the group of states at the

functions, in order to assure

.

its

Rome Conference that

effectiveness.

were willing

Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Canada, Argentina, South

.

voting on the no action

was

1

13-17,with 25 abstentions

to give the

They were made of more than 60
Africa, Senegal,
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The U.S. contended

that international

law prohibits the ICC from exercising

While

jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties.

testifying before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, Ambassador Scheffer asserted that the Treaty purports to establish

an arrangement whereby "U.S. armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably

prosecuted by the international Court even

by

the Treaty. This is contrary to the

position

is

buttressed

which provides
without

Article

that a "treaty

consent.

its

by

if

the United States has not agreed to be

most fundamental principles of

is

Law

This

of Treaties,

does not create either obligations or rights for a third State

'"^^^

that the source of obligation for the

not the Treaty but customary international law. This

Article 38 of the

treaty law."

34 of the Vienna Convention on the

However, some academics have opined
party State

bound

Vienna Convention which

37 precludes a rule

set forth in a treaty

is

to the effect that

is

non-

corroborated by

nothing in "Article 34 and

from becoming binding upon

third States as a

customary rule of international law recognized as such."

Customary Law according
of Justice

law

is

to Article

38 of the Statute of the International Court

defined as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."'*^' Customary

entails both a quantitative

qualitative element as reflected

element as reflected

by opinio

in

the practice of states and a

juris or states' declarations,

which constitute

their acquiescence of the rule of international law.*^^

David Scheffer,"Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate," 105* Cong., 2nd Sess., S.Hrg. 105-724, 13(July 23,1998)

^ Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties,

May

23,1969,art.34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,reprinted in 8

I.L.M. 679(1969)(hereinafter the Vienna Convention)
*"'

59 Stat. 1031
See Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit, International Law Cases and
Materials (Third Edition), at 54-57 See also, Section 102(2) of the Restatement Third of the Foreign
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,1945,art.38, para.l,

Relations

Law of the

United States (1987) which provides that customary law "results from a general and
is followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."

consistent practice of states which

3
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Indeed, the "opinio juris of states on the

Nuremberg

principles, the principles of

the Genocide Convention and universal jurisdiction over the core crimes,""**^^

compelling fact
"delegated

at

the

ICC Conference. Although most commentators
of the

territorial basis

ICC

was a

focus on the

as legitimizing its exercise of jurisdiction over the

nationals of non-party states," universal jurisdiction

is

also relevant given the unique

nature of the core crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
basis of jurisdiction require a nexus between the prosecuting state

ICC"^ While

other

and the offense, the

perpetrator or the victim, universal jurisdiction provides every state with jurisdiction over

a limited category of offenses generally recognized as of concern to the international

community, regardless where the offense occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator, or
the nationality of the victim.'*^^

However, the U.S. maintains

that the

"requirement of the

consent of the state on whose territory the crime was committed would be unnecessary

if

the Court's basis were universality."^^

The concept of
involves

the

gravity

universal jurisdiction has

of the crimes

involved.

universality principle are so egregious in scope

all

humanity and any

state

two

Many

of the crimes

and degree

subject

to

the

that they offend the interest of

may, as humanity's agent punish the offender.'^^^The second

involves the place where the crime was committed.
universality, occur in territory over

*^^

alternative predicates.'^^^The first

which no

state

Many

of the crimes that

fall

under

has jurisdiction, or in situations where

Sok Kim, supra note 382,at 74
& Kaysen eds. „supra note

Sewall

26, 215
^^ Kenneth C Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785,786
(1988)
David Scheffer, International Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction (address at the annual
meeting of the of the American Society of International Law, March 26, 1999),

Lee A. Steven, Genocide and
its

the

International Obligations,39 Vir.

Sewall

& Kaysen eds., supra

Duty

to Extradite or Prosecute:

J. Int'l

L.425, 434(1999)

note 26,at 216

Why

the United States

is

in

Breach of
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the territorial state

is

unlikely to exercise jurisdiction because the perpetrators are state

authorities or the crime

universal jurisdiction

was committed with

The

state complacency.'^^^

was piracy and U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence

enunciates that "pirates being hostis humani generis [enemies of

punishable in the tribunals of
for the mutual defense

all

nations. All nations are

and safety of

The four offenses within

engaged

first

crime of

in that

domain

mankind] are

all

in a league against

them

'^'^

all."

the subject matter jurisdiction of the

Rome

Statute

were

considered crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law by most

states

by

all

and experts, "even though
States."

1945, when the

humanity.

"^'^

A

their precise definition

had not been completely agreed

precedent was indeed set by the international community in

Nuremberg Charter enumerated

the first definition of crimes against

The U.N General Assembly subsequently recognized

Charter

the

jurisprudence of Nuremberg, and has also confirmed that no statute of limitations

and

may be

applied to bar prosecution of such crimes.

With a view

to avoiding the ex post facto application of laws that so tainted the

Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals,

the Statutes of the ad hoc

ICTY and ICTR were

drafted in order to cover only those crimes that were recognized

by the

community

the

as

crimes

of universal jurisdiction.

The need

for

strictly

international

"conservatively

formulated jurisdiction" of the ad hoc Tribunals was defended by the U.N. Secretary
General,

who

articulated that the "application of the principle of

nullum crimen sine lege

requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian

'"^
"'"

Id.,

United States

v. Smith,18 U.S. 153(1820)
" See generally Leila Sadat & S. Richard Garden, The
Revolution,88 Geo. L. J. 381(2000)

New International

Criminal Court:

An Uneasy
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law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so
of some but not

Chamber of

the

all

states to specific

ICTY

conventions does not

problem of adherence

arise.

"'^'^

The Appeals

has held that crimes within the Court's Statute, including war

crimes in internal conflict, are amenable to universal

Michael P Scharf
definition

that the

is

jurisdiction.'*'^

of the opinion that "customary international law on the

and scope of the war crimes and crimes against humanity has been

and crystallized by the promulgation of the Statutes of the

ICTY

and...ICTR, the

decisions rendered by these tribunals, and the acceptance of the international

of these developments.

clarified

community

"*'*

Domestic courts

in

Spain and the United

Kingdom have determined

that

former

Chilean dictator, Augusto Ugarte Pinochet, could be tried in both countries under the
principle of universal jurisdiction for acts of torture and other crimes against humanity

committed

in

Chile during his tenure

at the

helm of the

state.'*'^

The House of Lords

held that although the basic reasoning varies in detail, the "basic proposition

all... is that

torture is an international crime over

to the Torture

^^^

1961,'*'^and John

Israeli state.

A

On

in 1988'*'^ for

Report of the Secretary General Pursuant
U.N. Doc S/25704,para.34 (1993)
Prosecutor

v.

& Kaysen, supra note 26,

Regina

v.

Regina

v.

in

crimes committed before the creation of the

to

Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808(1993),

Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR, para..94 (Oct.2, 1995),35

Sewall

ILM

32(1996)

219

Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate.ejc parte Pinochet Ugarte,2 W.L.R.

272(H.L)(1999),reprinted in 38
*'*

Eichmann

court in Senegal on the basis of universal jurisdiction, indicted the former

'''^

"'^

to

wherever the

to all courts

the basis of universal jurisdiction, Israel tried Adolf

Demjanjuk

common

which international law and the parties

Convention have given universal jurisdiction

torture occurs."

also

ILM

430(1999)

Bartle ex parte Pinochet, H.L.(March 24,1999)

"^ Attorney General
of Israel v. Eichmann,36 I.L.R. 277,299,304(Isr.Sup.Ct. 1962)
"'^
Demjanjuk v. State of Israel (Special Issue),395-395
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dictator of

Chad, Hissen Habre. Thus,

Rome merely as

scribes writing

down

it

is

certainly "possible to

view the

drafters in

already existing customary international law, rather

than as legislators prescribing laws for the international community.

The argument has been made

that if states

""^'^

have jurisdiction to investigate and

prosecute these international crimes under the banner of universal jurisdiction, they can
collectively confer this jurisdiction to the ICC,

German Delegation
"There

is

to the

ICC Conference concluded

virtue of the

Rome

Treaty.

The

that:

no reason why the ICC established under the basis of a Treaty concluded by the

largest possible

number of

should not be in the same position to exercise universal

states,

jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against

the Contracting Parties themselves.

If

by

any individual

state

humanity and war crimes

in the

same manner

as

""^^^

can try a war criminal, regardless of nationality, for these core

crimes, then the conference participants rightfully

empowered

the

ICC

with the same

rights.

However, opponents of universal

jurisdiction

as

a basis for

ICC

exercising

jurisdiction over non-State Parties, like the U.S, claim that:

There

is

no instance of

prior state practice involving the delegation of states'

jurisdiction to an international court without the consent of the defendant's state

of nationality. The International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda base
Tokyo

on Security Council powers under Chapter VII.The
on Japan's consent. And the Nuremberg
jurisdiction on the consent of the Allies, acting as the German

their jurisdiction

Tribunal... based

Tribunal based
sovereign.

its

its

jurisdiction

'^^^

The compelling conclusion from

this

group's perspective

is

that

none of the four

modem

international tribunals has exercised the delegated jurisdiction of states "in the absence of

See Sadat & Garden, supra note 411
See German Proposal, U.N.Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (Mar.l6-Apr.3, 1998), U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/DP.2 (Mar.23, 1998)
Madeline Morris, The Jurisdiction of the International
Inte
Criminal Court Over Nationals of Non-Party
States,6

ILSA

J. Int'l

& Comp. L.

363,366-367
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consent by the defendant's state of nationality. Therefore, there appears to be no prior
instance of state practice to support the ICC's exercise of universal jurisdiction delegated

to

it

without the consent of the defendant's state of nationality.""*^^

Advocates for an effective ICC with broad based jurisdiction, assert
United States claims

itself.

The

is

nationality

a problem is already an international

and

territoriality principles

international law. Phillipe Kirsch,

Chairman of the

In particular, the territorial basis

is

are the

that

what the

norm recognized by

the U.S.

most firmly established

Rome Diplomatic

in

Conference writes:

the primary jurisdictional link accepted in

all

legal

systems and confirmed in numerous conventions, including those on genocide, torture,
hostage taking, and several forms of terrorism. This does not bind states that are not
parties to the Statute.

It

simply confirms the recognized principle that individuals are

subject to the substantive and procedural criminal law applicable in the territories to

which they

travel, including

That

said, there is

laws arising from treaty obligations."*^^

no novelty

in conferring universal jurisdiction

non-party states through the mechanism of treaty law.

numerous

international treaties that

endow

The United

over nationals of

States is party to

State Parties to exercise jurisdiction over

perpetrators of any nationality found within their territory, irrespective of whether the

state of the

that

accused's nationality

is

also a party to the

none of these conventions purport

by the nationals of

parties;

treaty."*^"*

Worthy of note

to limit their application to the offenses

the fact

committed

nor do the U.S statutes implementing the conventions limit

prosecution to the nationals of signatory parties.

The United

States has indeed exercised

treaty based universal jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states

Phillipe Kirsch,

is

The Rome Conference on

the International Criminal Court:

even

in cases

A Comment.ASIL

Newsletter,! (No v/Dec. 199)
^^'*

These include amongst others the 1949 Geneva Conventions; the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention; the
1970 Hijacking Convention; the 1971 Aircraft Sabotage Convention; the 1988 Airport Security Protocol;
the 1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention; the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention; the 1984
Torture Convention; the 1988 Maritime Terrorism Convention; et al. See also Sewall & Kaysen cds., supra
note 26,220
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where the crime was not recognized by customary international law as being subject

to

universal jurisdiction/^^

clear that the

It is

ratification

the fate of

by
its

ICC Treaty

the U.S. Senate.

will

have a

The United

difficult

time

if it

ever comes up for

States has legitimate reasons to

peacekeepers around the world, and the possibility of these facing the

one day. However, the principle of complementarity

stipulates that the

exercise jurisdiction over U.S. citizens unless the U.S. justice system

unable to prosecute. This

is

Treaty or not,

its

U.S. would have lost

citizens

its

this question,

"Can

moral ground."

states."^^^

'^^^

The U.S

International

is

will not

unwilling or

came

to

terms with the fact that whether

would be amenable

it

signed the

to the jurisdiction of the

ICC.The

right to participate in further conferences or discussion

remaining issues of the ICC,
the rules of procedure

ICC

ICC

highly unlikely, given the reputation of the U.S. justice

system. That said, the United Sates

Rome

worry about

like the selection

and evidence amongst

on

of judges, prosecutors and in establishing

others.'*^^

One

observer concludes by asking

the United States aspire to world leadership without holding the high

The United did
finally

came

sign the

Rome

to terms with the

Treaty on the eve of the deadline for

uncompromising conclusion

that the

Criminal Court can legitimately investigate, indict and prosecute U.S

"" See cases of United States v. Yunis,924 F.2d 1086(D.C. Cir. 1998)(where the U.S. indicted,
apprehended,and prosecuted Fawaz Yunis,a Lebanese national, for hijacking a Jordanian airliner with 2 US
citizens in it, from Beirut airport. US inter alia, asserted jurisdiction on the basis of the Hostage Taking
Convention, eventhough Lebanon is not a state party to the convention. The D.C. Cir. Court upheld its
jurisdiction based on the domestic legislation implementing the Hostage Taking Convention that had
conferred on it universal and passive personality jurisdiction over this type of terrorist act.).See also United
States v. Ali Rezaq,134 F.2d 1 121(D.C. Cir.l998)(here, the US prosecuted a Palestinian national for
hijacking an Egyptian airliner, despite the fact that Palestine

is

not party to the

Hague Hijacking

Convention.)
*^^
"•^
"^^

Sinanayan, supra note 387, at 1 189
See Young Sok Kim, supra note 382,at 80
U.N. doc. A/CONF. 183/9(Rome Statute was opened for signature

Headquarters, until 30,December 2000).

in

New

York,

at the

U.N.
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officials for

crimes committed in the

that the U.S. is not a signatory to the

territories

of State Parties, notwithstanding the fact

Rome Treaty.

CONCLUSION
The

international

community heralded and greeted

pomp and

an International Criminal Court with
limits, deficiencies

the

Rome

Statute establishing

pageantry. Designed to overcome the

and lacunae of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICC

is

expected to forge the missing link in the international legal community by creating a

forum

to prosecute

and punish individuals, irrespective of

their official positions for the

most serious crimes against humanity. The International Court of Justice cannot play
role, since

ICC

that the

articles

has capacity to hear only cases between States. Worthy of note

it

is still

However, no sooner had

in

Rome.

the dust settled

pundits

come

conflict

and compromise. The leverage of

terms with the fact that the

potent, the concept of sovereignty very

these assertions.

Many

states in

traditionally reserved to states

contains

some

the fact

an untested judicial entity and will remain in the abstract until sixty

of ratification are deposited

to

is

this

on the

Rome

alive,

Rome were wary

Conference did

realm of international law

and the ICC Statute

of allowing the

ICC

is

is still

a testament to

to exercise

powers

would negatively impact national sovereignty. The

intricate jurisdictional

legal

Treaty was the product of political

states in the

much

Rome

treaty

provisions on the vaguely defined concept of

complememtarity. While the ICC defers to national courts as a matter of principle, that

primacy of national courts would be
is

vitiated

when

it is

determined that the national court

grossly incompetent to try the case. There are also times

when

defer to the ICC, despite their usual objections. This occurs

98

the national courts

when

must

the Security Council

99

acting under

its

Chapter VII powers under the U.N. Charter ascertains that there

threat to international peace

and security, and thus seeks to redress the

Until the International

it is

indeed

of fact to ascertain the exact meanings and contours of the

this trier

Though

situation.

Criminal Court becomes fully operational and

making renditions on some of the provisions on complementarity,

the question whether the

ICC and

its

starts

difficult for

Rome

Statute.

and the deterrence of the most heinous

a milestone in the fight against impunity

and egregious crimes, the Statute also has

a

is

loopholes. This conclusion seeks to answer

dominant principle,"complementarity", constitute a

its

regression of international law or not.

A

closer look at Article 12 of the

custody of an accused person,
jurisdiction.

custodial

Human

Statute elicits that the state,

not one of the

is

means by which

the

which has

ICC can

obtain

were nervous about the unfortunate exclusion of the

rights groups

They claim

state.

Rome

that

excluding

the

custodial

was unnecessary under

international law because the latter already allows individual states to try perpetrators of

core genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity under the principle of universal

jurisdiction.''^^ Critics fear that the

the leaders "kill their

from

their

home

own

states,

ICC

will

people on their

be ineffective

own

in dealing

territory,"'*^^

Indeed,the exclusion of the custodial state

See Melissa

Rome
*^^

and decide not to stray away

gamer wide

accused person

jurisdiction, such an

free to travel out of his country without the specter of

to

if

they would not be accessible for prosecution before the ICC.

However, with the principle of universal

Rome Treaty

with rogue states

was one of

the

some type of

may

not be

prosecution.

compromises necessary

for the

support.

M Marler, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in The

Statute,49

Duke

L.J.

825( 1 999)

Theodor Meron, The Court

We Want, Wash.Post,

at

A

15(Oct.l3, 1998)

100

Another shortcoming
citizens of State Parties that

the opt-out provision

Human

rights groups

for a court that

Rights Watch,

you've got

six

is

is

in the

have

Rome

Statute

ratified the

is

the "opt-out" clause/'^' which gives

Treaty the opportunity to take advantage of

and be immune from war crimes prosecution for seven

years.

have questioned the raison d'etre of such a paradoxical provision

expected to prosecute those war crimes. Richard Dicker, of

Human

of the opinion that this "sends a message to potential war criminals-

-

and a half years to do the job... That's not justice. That's nonsense."*^^

The possibihty of

deferral of a case

Council resolution was hotly contested
the fundamental role played by the

in

UNSC

from the ICC subsequent

Rome. Although
in

there

to a

U.N. Security

was unananimity

that

maintaining peace and security should not

be disturbed, there was disagreement as to the degree of control the Security Council
should have over the

new

Court.'*"'^

When

can make referrals to the ICC and by

acting under

that token,

its

Chapter Vll powers. Council

compel national

judicial authorities to

devolve their primacy to the ICC. However, the Security Council can also suspend any

by the ICC or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve

investigation

has also been described as one of the
that

authorization

to

of the Treaty. The United States contended

must be obtained from the Security Council

prosecution could be pursued.

Council

pitfalls

The "like-minded"

have unbridled control

would

before

any ICC

States and others, thought that allowing

constitute

independence and effectiveness of the ICC, since

Rome Treaty,

months.'*^'*This

it

is

a

major impediment

a political

to

the

body where each of

art. 124
See Richard Didder, in Melissa Marler, supra note 429, 841
"*"
Sewall & Kaysen eds., supra note 26, 75
Art. 16 provides that: No investigation or prosecution may be commence or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by
the Council under the same condition.
''^'

*^^

its
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five

permanent members have a

veto."*^^

members would have stymied any ICC
Statute as adopted in

Rome, "balances

Under

any veto by the permanent

this scenario,

prosecution.

To

avoid

it

possible for a single veto to

prevent the suspension or renewal of Security Council deferral.

power of

the

UNSC

in the sense that, all the five

on a resolution before the ICC can be barred.
then the

ICC would continue

In addition to the

flaw, the

respect for the Security Council's role with the

need to maintain the independence of the ICC," by making

original

monumental

this

'^^^

This indeed dilutes the

permanent members must agree

one of these members wields

If

its

veto,

with the prosecution of the case.

above lacunae, the ICC's ratione rewpon^ jurisdiction

only to crimes committed after

its

coming

is

limited

into existence.'^^^Although this depicts the

importance accorded to the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (no crime or penalty
without lawj principle and the rights of the accused,

it

also

means

that

most of the

heinous crimes committed before the Statute comes into force would not be subject to the

ICC's jurisdiction.
Another shortcoming concerns the

fact that the

over the crime of aggression, due to the fact that the
with a definition. Athough aggression

is

ICC would

Rome

Conference

jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until the

*^^
''•*

Sewall
Id. at

failed to

come up

one of the crimes within the ICC's subject

matter jurisdiction, the Statute specifically provides that the

definition

not have jurisdiction

Assembly of

and appropriate conditions. "^^^The Court thus finds

ICC

shall not exercise

State Parties develops a

itself in

an uncomfortable

& Kaysen eds., supra note 26, at 75

76

Art. 11(1) provides:

The Court has jurisdiction only with

respect to crimes committed after the entry into

force of this Statute.

The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under

Art. 5(2) provides:

adopted

in

is

102

where

situation

aggression, which

That
courts

when

can investigate and prosecute war crimes, but cannot prosecute

it

is

the mother of

war crimes.
between

said, the issue of concurrent jurisdiction

is topical.

The advent of

international criminal courts

and international

states

marks the "end of an era

the exercise of criminal jurisdiction fell within the unfettered prerogatives of the

sovereign

state.

"'^^^

The

statutes of the

ad hoc tribunals resolve the jurisdictional conflict

with national judicial systems by granting the former primacy over the

latter.

This reflects

a scenario where states have to defer their criminal sovereign jurisdiction to international

bodies.

the

However,

ICC

the principle of complementarity provides the opposite scenario

defers to national courts, except in cases where the latter

is

where

incompetent or

unable and unwilling to investigate a crime.
Inspite of the unequivocal

primacy of the ad hoc tribunals, the

been adequately implemented and enforced, makes

primacy

is

it

difficult

fact that

to establish

functionally superior to complementarity .The Milosevic case

example of the

jurisdictional

it

is

gap between de jure and de facto primacy. Facts

has not

whether

a defining

elicit that

Milosevic would not have been deferred or extradited to the Hague without the financial

and economic clout of the West, and the United States

in

particular. This sets an

uncertain precedent because, there are indeed no clear cut rules to apply primacy in a case

where the
to

do

so.

state

which

is

expected to defer an accused to the international Tribunal refuses

The Milosevic case

perils of primacy.

indeed a case study to be revisited, for

it

enunciates the

Milosevic was indicted alongside four other dignitaries of Serbia.

of them Milan Milutinovic,

which the Court

is

is

actually the President of Serbia

shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.

with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

'*^^Brown, supra note l,at

430

and there

Such a provision

is

One

no pressure for

shall

be consistent

103

The Hague

these indictees to be extradited to

for prosecution.

The absence of an

enforcement agency as well as the failure of the Security Council to vigorously

implement primacy allows
international

impunity,

it

community's intention were

would not succeed

At the
retaining

Rome

to

in this venture

send the message that there

by trying Milosevic

Conference for an ICC,

some form of

snub the edicts of the U.N.

recalcitrant states to

it

no room

were resolved on

control on their criminal sovereign jurisdiction. This

is

supranationalism and state sovereignty. Despite criticisms that the compromise

advance the

makes

settled for the "lowest acceptable

interests of international law,"

that

state is genuine.

is

ICC and

the

Thus,

at

the

the case of the ad hoc tribunals. This

is

Rome

same time

in

not State Parties which

can with guarded caution say

conformity with the principle of

retains

especially so

to

and whether the investigation

this trier of fact

even though the ICC defers to national courts

complementarity, complementarity

is

it

at

denominator of juridiction, unable

the final decision as to the admissibility of a case

and prosecution by a

reflected

which represents a delicate compromise between

in the principle of complementarity,

was one which

for

alone.

clear that states

is

is

If the

some

when

vestiges of primacy, as

the Security Council refers a

case to the ICC. In such a case, national courts will defer to the ICC, thus creating a
scenario similar to the primacy of the ad hoc tribunals.

The

experience

with

primacy

helped

shape

the

approach

towards

complementarity. For concurrent jurisdiction between international courts and national
judicial systems to succeed, there

two

fora.

A

is

the

need for a comprehensive protocol between the

foremost expert on the topic, Madeline Morris,

is

of the opinion that

concurrence of jurisdiction "raises complex questions of regarding cooperation in

104

and

investigations

effectiveness

are

sharing

to

of

evidence.

Obvious

advantages

and

efficiency

in

be gained by close national and international cooperation

investigations and evidence gathering.'"*^^

As witnessed

in the

ICTR, and ICTY

in

in the

Milosevic case, another area with potential for uncertainties and tension between the
international

and the national fora concerns the distribution of defendants.'^'Xhese

problems are

at

times due to lack of communication or fundamental conflict of interests,

with each forum wanting to exercise the inherent jurisdiction they have. However, the
"threshold

requirement

for

international jurisdictions

tribunal

is

to

is

greater

coherence

in

the

interaction

a clear articulation, in each case in

of

national

and

which an international

be convened, of the needs which that particular tribunal

is

intended to

meet."^^

The broad range of
jurisdiction

issues regarding the concurrence of national and international

formed the premise for complementarity.

primacy, one author opines that there are

"many

In

difficult

international tribunals as effective in enforcing the

a treatise on the perils of

problems involved

in

making

law as most domestic courts" but

because some of these "have proven so intractable, international lawyers have avoided

examining the premise
international legal

that the goals of accountability are furthered

by primacy."

The

paradigm attempts to merge the "profoundly consensual" nature of jus

gentium with the "profoundly coercive" nature of national criminal law, by imposing the
principle of primacy. Complementarity takes the opposite course

by endowing national

courts with primacy over the ICC, where the latter only complements.

*^ Morris, supra note 100, 362
442
*^^

jj

Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda,24 Yale

J. Int'l

L. 365,387(1999)
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It is

the

humble view of

this trier

of fact that until the

Rome, and

after the deposition of sixty articles

of ratification

States Parties and their judiciaries,

would be an exercise

state

it

at

ICC comes

starts interacting

in conjecture to

which of the principles between primacy and complementarity

jurisdiction

between

states

and international

courts.

into existence

is

go

forth

with

and

best for concurrent
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